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PATENT PORTFOLIOS AS SECURITIES
MICHAEL RISCH†
ABSTRACT
Companies of all types are buying, selling, and licensing patents—
not just individual patents, but many patents bundled into large
portfolios. A primary problem with these transactions is that the
market is illiquid: parties cannot identify holders of relevant
portfolios, they cannot agree on the value of portfolios, and the
specter of litigation taints every negotiation.
This Article presents a new way to improve market formation and
integrity by proposing that patent portfolios be treated as securities. If
patent-portfolio transactions are treated like stock transactions, sellers
steering clear of fraud laws may be forced to disclose information
about patent value. Furthermore, patent transactions previously
consummated in “dark markets” might now be traded in public
clearinghouses. Ultimately, parties that openly transact will develop
objective pricing methodologies that reduce the costs of negotiation
and decrease the leverage that portfolio holders exert on potential
licensees.
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INTRODUCTION
Patents are the new securities. They are bought and sold with
1
frequency. Their resale value is often derived from an expected
2
stream of revenue. In short, they are valuable assets that can
appreciate, depreciate, and result in gains and losses upon sale. As
such, they should be tradable on a market like securities. This Article
suggests one way to improve market formation for patents: by
treating patent portfolios like securities. Despite the recognition that
3
4
patent markets are important and that portfolios are important, this

1. See Anne Kelley, Practicing in the Patent Marketplace, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 117
(2011); Nicholas Figueroa & Carlos J. Serrano, Patent Trading Flows of Small and Large Firms
25–27 (Apr. 15, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2251084.
2. 14 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS § 6833 (rev. vol. 2012).
3. See Edmund W. Kitch, Elementary and Persistent Errors in the Economic Analysis of
Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1727, 1740 (2000) (“It is clear that the ability of the
owners of intellectual property rights to transfer these rights in whole or in part to others is an
important feature of the systems. The rights can easily arise in the hands of persons or firms who
are not in the best position to exploit them. In order to involve others in the full exploitation of
the economic potential of the right, the owners must be able to enter into a wide range of
arrangements with other firms.”); Aleksandar Nikolic, Securitization of Patents and Its
Continued Viability in Light of the Current Economic Conditions, 19 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 393,
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Article is the first to study the implications of treating patent
portfolios as securities per se. Given the reality of patent aggregation,
we should consider securities laws as a way to make current markets
better.
This is not to say that patents have never been associated with
securities. Indeed, some speculators have packaged patents into
bundled portfolios that are then sold in pieces to investors, which is a
traditional way that patents, mortgages, or any other asset classes are
5
“securitized.” Investors are then paid their portion of any licensing or
litigation profits associated with the bundle. But patent portfolios that
have not been packaged into a traditional security have escaped
regulatory scrutiny, despite having many similar features. Like
traditional securitization, portfolios are bought and sold, and the
owner of the portfolio obtains profits. This Article examines how
patent portfolios might be treated as securities even when ownership
of the portfolio is not divided among many investors.
Individual patents differ from company stock, the most
traditional security, in important ways. Unlike stock, patents are not
necessarily representative of the profits generated by an underlying
business. Instead, patents generate revenue directly when sold or
licensed, thus providing only a piece of a patent-holder’s profits.
Further, the value of any particular patent will be both disputed and
6
volatile. Parties to a transaction often disagree about whether a
409 (2009) (“Another factor that could lead to increased patent securitization is the creation of
regulated markets for intellectual property, providing information and access to trading.”). See
generally Naomi Lamoreaux and Kenneth Sokoloff, Long-Term Change in the Organization of
Inventive Activity, 93 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 12, 686 (1996) (describing the growth of patent
markets in the nineteenth century); Mark A. Lemley & Nathan Myhrvold, How To Make a
Patent Market, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 257 (2007) (discussing the importance of information about
patent prices to the creation of a well-functioning market).
4. See generally Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA.
L. REV. 1 (2005) (outlining a theory of patent value in which the worth of a patent portfolio is
greater than the sum of its individual parts).
5. See, e.g., Nikolic, supra note 3, at 404 (discussing traditional patent securitization); Jeff
Leung, Patent Securitizations, Patently Bad Idea – Risk/Benefit Approach Reveals Possible
Reasons for Lack of Patent Securitizations, IPL NEWSL. (Am. Bar. Ass’n Section of Intellectual
Prop. Law), Fall 2006, at 4, 4–5 (discussing portfolio requirements for traditional securitization).
See generally Mario Calderini & Cristina Odasso, Intellectual Property Portfolio Securitization:
An Evidence Based Analysis (unpublished manuscript) (discussing potential markets for
traditional securitization), available at http://www2.druid.dk/conferences/viewpaper.php?id=
5618&cf=32.
6. Indeed, accounting rules do not allow employee-invented patents to be booked as
assets because there is no purchase price associated with them. Malcolm T. Meeks & Charles A.
Eldering, Patent Valuation: Aren't We Forgetting Something? Making the Case for Claims
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7

patent is valid and/or infringed; if either proves untrue, the patent
8
loses its value. Furthermore, patentees might interpret any party
seeking a license for its product as an admission of infringement, thus
9
tainting prices. As a result, each patent—indeed, each patent
10
transaction—has a different value negotiated secretly. This means
that the low volume of trading and related lack of price information is
insufficient to set a market price. These features seem far removed
from stock. If patents are the new securities, they are highly illiquid
securities.
11
Patent portfolios—aggregated groups of patents—are different;
they exhibit many similarities with traditional securities. As with any
volatile asset, diversifying many patents into a portfolio deemphasizes

Analysis in Patent Valuation by Proposing a Patent Valuation Method and a Patent-Specific
Discount Rate Using the CAPM, 9 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 194, 195 (2010); cf. Zvi
Griliches, Bronwyn H. Hall & Ariel Pakes, R&D, Patents, and Market Value Revisited: Is There
a Second (Technological Opportunity) Factor? 26 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 2624, 1988) (finding a $3.2 million standard deviation in patent value).
7. Amy L. Landers, Patent Valuation Theory and the Economics of Improvement, 88 TEX.
L. REV. 163, 166 (2010) (“Additional contingencies complicate patent valuation for licensing
discussions, including claim scope, validity, and enforceability.”); Meeks & Eldering, supra note
6, at 198 (“As a result, licensing negotiations essentially become ‘mini’ patent trials . . . .”).
8. See John F. Duffy, Rules and Standards on the Forefront of Patentability, 51 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 609, 611–13 (2009) (discussing the comparative merits of rules that apply
generally to standards that are applied to individual patents); Kelly Casey Mullally, Legal
(Un)certainty, Legal Process, and Patent Law, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1109, 1125–34 (2010)
(describing pressure for rules from the U.S. Patent and Trade Office and pressure for standards
from the Supreme Court); John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV.
771, 799–800 (2003) (arguing that standards applied to each patent are better for patent policy
than formal rules).
9. See F. Russell Denton & Paul J. Heald, Random Walks, Non-Cooperative Games, and
the Complex Mathematics of Patent Pricing, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 1175, 1177 (2003)
(“Unfortunately, patent pricing presents a difficulty not present in most stock option deals
because merely inquiring about acquiring a license will affect its price.”). Like Schrödinger’s cat,
a patent is both worthless and priceless until investigated.
10. Michael S. Kramer, Valuation and Assessment of Patents and Patent Portfolios Through
Analytical Techniques, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 463, 465 (2007) (“In light of the
prerequisites to achieve patent protection, the value of a patent, by definition, must be
unique.”).
11. Gideon Parchomovsky and R. Polk Wagner have argued that portfolios are valuable
even if individual patents are not. See Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 4, at 52 (“The
whole is greater than the sum of its parts: the benefits of patent portfolios in the modern
innovation environment are, we suggest, so substantial as to explain the heretofore largely
unexplained ‘value gap’ at the heart of the patent paradox.”). But see Alexander I. Poltorak,
Valuing Individual Patents Comprising a Portfolio, PAT. STRATEGY & MGMT (Law Journal
Newsletters, Phila., Pa.), Oct. 2003 (reprint at 2) (proposing a valuation that assumes the
portfolio value must equal the sum of the values of each patent), available at
http://www.generalpatent.com/files/PSM-Oct2003.pdf.
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the highs and lows of any given piece of the pie. Although the value
of each patent in the portfolio may vary wildly, the portfolio as a
12
whole will maintain a more stable value than its constituent parts.
Even though a portfolio reduces the ability of any single
constituent patent to affect overall value, diversified portfolios are
still subject to systemic risk. They face this risk because aggregated
13
patents usually cover similar technology. Thus, if patents in general
or patents relating to the technology in the portfolio become more
14
valuable, then the portfolio will increase in value. If, however,
patents as a whole or in a technology area become devalued, then the
portfolio will decrease in value. Furthermore, portfolios of specific
15
types of patents, such as those covering a specific product, will rise
and fall with court rulings that affect them. But a properly diversified
portfolio would include patents covering different types of products
16
in a technology area to mitigate this risk. The risk analysis, however,
is similar to that of securities: even diversified securities portfolios
might be subject to systemic risk.
Because of these and other similarities, this Article proposes that
patent portfolios, but perhaps not individual patents, should be
treated like securities to help patent markets behave more like public
securities markets. The benefits of securities markets are wellrecognized, or at the very least well-idealized. Securities markets are
transparent: everyone knows the price. They are open: anyone with
enough money may purchase stock. They are somewhat efficient and
12. Cf. Jiaqing “Jack” Lu, Decompose and Adjust Patent Sales Prices for Patent Portfolio
Valuation, LICENSING ECON. REV., Mar. 2013, at 71, 75 (finding that portfolio value grows
nonlinearly with portfolio size), available at http://www.lesk.org/include/downfile.asp?folder=
board&filename=11_LU5Edit.pdf.
13. See Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 4, at 29–30 (“In the patent portfolio theory,
relatedness is an important feature: unlike corporate stock portfolios, for example, where broad
diversification is a typical goal, patent portfolios are more narrowly focused within a
technological field.”).
14. See id. at 39–40 (arguing that portfolios reduce risk associated with uncertainty in law).
Parchomovsky and Wagner assume that legal changes will affect different types of patents
differently, rather than all patents for each change. Presumably, some changes will affect every
patent as well.
15. See, e.g., id. at 30 (describing specific portfolios targeted at a particular product,
process, or problem).
16. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring
2005, at 75, 81 (arguing that patentees file related continuation applications to hedge their bets
that an original application becomes valueless); Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 4, at 30
(“[W]hile patent portfolios consist of related patents, this is not to say they are not diverse in
any respect. Indeed, it is the ability to leverage the differences among collected patents that
makes patent portfolios a powerful tool in the modern, innovation-driven marketplace.”).
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transparent: anyone offering to buy or sell can complete a transaction,
with the stock going to parties willing to pay the agreed price. There
are exceptions, of course, but stock markets are generally well17
behaved.
In contrast, patent markets are opaque: no one knows the price,
18
who owns the patents, or even whether a relevant patent exists.
19
They are illiquid and shallow: only those with patents may sell, and
20
only those with potentially infringing products will acquire licenses.
They are inefficient: parties cannot agree on prices, and injunction
21
risks might inflate prices. Patent markets are not well-behaved.
Despite these shortcomings, patent portfolios behave more like
securities than individual patents. Many types of companies trade
them, and they could be considered securities under the law.
Importantly, securities treatment will reach patent sale and licensing
transactions that patent law is ill-equipped to handle.
Treating patent portfolios as securities would improve market
integrity with respect to particularly abusive mass demand-letter
campaigns by treating such campaigns as public offerings. Further,
ordinary transactions, even if exempt from registration requirements,
would be subject to heightened disclosure requirements. With respect
to forming better patent markets, a primary benefit would be to
emphasize the importance of disclosure and market clearinghouses
for patent-portfolio licensing. This, of course, has always been
possible, but treating portfolios like securities may help create a
functioning patent-portfolio license, sale market, and culture of more
efficient pricing.

17. To be sure, nonpublic markets are less liquid and efficient, but even illiquid
transactions with multiple parties will apply the same price to all buyers, and that price is often
used for later negotiations.
18. Dietmar Harhoff, The Role of Patents and Licenses in Securing External Finance for
Innovation, 14 EURO. INVEST. BANK PAPERS, no. 2, 2009, at 74, 83 (2009), available at
http://www.eib.org/attachments/efs/eibpapers/eibpapers_2009_v14_n02_en.pdf;
Lemley
&
Myrhvold, supra note 3, at 257.
19. Presumably, of course, one could short sell a patent with the hopes of obtaining it later.
Because patents are unique and illiquid, however, such short sales would be extremely risky.
20. Here, too, there are many types of securities (maybe even most) that are also shallow
and illiquid.
21. See RPX Corp., Investor Presentation 8 (June 2013), available at http://files.
shareholder.com/downloads/ABEA-5XYKB4/0x0x523306/4CC42999-6166-4C95-81929CE54759BE8D/RPXQ3Invest_Web.pdf (describing the risks of litigation as they affect the
valuation of patent portfolios).
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This proposal sidesteps the normative question of whether such a
market would be socially beneficial and thus should exist at all. Some
might argue that a market for the right to exclude others harms
22
innovation, and thus ought to be discouraged. Others see some
23
benefit in a market for invention, and might argue that this
particular type of market should be encouraged. These are important
questions to be studied, but they concern how the system should be
rather than how it currently operates. This Article presumes that, for
political or economic reasons, current practices will continue, and that
securities law is a way forward. This Article presents its proposal in
three parts.
Part I discusses how companies aggregate patents into large
portfolios. According to conventional wisdom, such aggregation has
traditionally been pursued by companies that do not sell any products
24
or services themselves, so-called nonpracticing entities (NPEs).
Though many criticize NPEs, recent scholarship and patent
aggregation activities by product and service companies imply that
portfolio aggregation is no longer just about NPEs, if it ever was.
Part II explores the properties of patent portfolios, showing how
they fit the definition of securities. To the extent that patent sales and
licenses are contracts that provide speculative value, they may fit the
25
definition of “investment contract” and thus constitute a security.
Part III suggests some legal and practical implications of treating
portfolios as securities. First, if patent portfolios are securities, then
they will be subject to a new regulatory framework that improves
market integrity. They may not be sold to the public without
registration, they will be subject to disclosure rules, and they will face
heightened fraud prohibitions. Second, securities regulation may

22. See Colleen Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls 14–15 (Santa Clara Univ. Legal Studies
Research Paper No. 09-12, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2146251 (describing the harms associated with assertion of patents against small companies).
23. See, e.g., Oskar Liivak, Establishing an Island of Patent Sanity, 78 BROOKLYN L. REV.
(forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 4–7) (describing the benefits of a market for invention),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2205996.
24. Commentators dispute what constitutes an NPE. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Are
Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611, 630 (2008);
Michael Risch, What is a Patent Troll?, PRAWFSBLAWG (Apr. 15, 2011), http://prawfsblawg.
blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2011/04/what-is-a-patent-troll.html.
25. See Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(1) 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2012) (including “investment
contract” in the definition of “security”); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(a)(10) (2012) (same). For further discussion of patent portfolios as investment-contract
securities, see infra Part II.C.
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encourage the formation of transparent market clearinghouses and
development of methods for determining pricing, both of which are
critical to an efficient market function.
I. NONPRACTICING ENTITIES, PRODUCT COMPANIES, AND PATENT
AGGREGATION
Patents do not confer the right to practice the claimed invention.
Instead, they only provide the right to exclude, giving the owner of
the patent the ability to seek damages and/or injunctions against
26
others who practice the patent. Thus, when two competitors own
patents, it gives neither the freedom to operate, but both the right to
cross-sue each other for infringement on the products they make.
This leads to a sort of détente in which competitors will either leave
one another alone or cross-license their patents. These product- and
service-providing companies are often synonymously called practicing
entities or productive companies.
Patents are also alienable: they may be bought or sold at will.
The lure of profits has led to the rise of patent aggregators who
purchase patents and enforce them against others who infringe the
acquired patents. These aggregators, called NPEs, patent assertion
entities (PAEs), or, more pejoratively, patent trolls, buy patents and
assert them against others as their primary source of revenue.
As the number of NPEs has grown, so has the number of their
critics. The conventional wisdom is that NPEs block innovation by
forcing productive companies to pay for a patent license without
27
adding any value to society themselves. A core problem, some
people argue, is that NPEs have no fear of being cross-sued for
infringement, and thus are unwilling to settle on reasonable terms—
there is no détente. But the conventional wisdom is incomplete.
Patent aggregation is not limited to NPEs anymore, if it ever was.

26. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006).
27. See James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs of NPE Disputes, 99
CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 21–22), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2091210 (“Effectively, what defendants pay in costs as a result of
NPE litigation reduces their own R&D budgets. This is because companies become targets for
litigation mainly when they introduce innovative products. Hence R&D managers must
anticipate NPE costs as part of the cost of innovating.”). Of course, this statement takes no
account of the huge profits these companies earn and refuse to spend on R&D or even return to
shareholders. See Jeff Macke, Einhorn Sues Apple! Will His Battle Save the Stock? YAHOO! FIN.
BREAKOUT (Feb. 7, 2013), http://finance.yahoo.com/blogs/breakout/einhorn-sues-apple-battlesave-stock-160610124.html.
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A. Nonpracticing Entities and Invention
Though NPEs do not make products, they bear more similarities
to practicing inventors than many previously thought. First,
aggregation by NPEs is not particularly new; some of the most
28
litigious NPEs have been active for twenty-five years or more.
Furthermore, some of the most famous patentees in history, like
Thomas Edison, did not make products for all of the patents they
29
enforced. Even IBM today does not make products relating to many
30
of its patents. In short, the long history of U.S. invention has been
one of patent acquisition and enforcement, with and without
accompanying products.
Second, NPEs obtain their patents from product and service
companies. A recent study of litigious NPEs showed that patents
asserted by NPEs came from corporations, more than 40 percent of
which were classified by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office as
31
having more than five hundred employees. Thus, even though NPEowned patents are not currently practiced by NPEs, they came from
research and development efforts prior to sale, much like patents of
practicing companies.
Third, NPEs do not appear to have any special impact on
venture capital investment. In theory, any investment decision should
depend on downstream liquidation or recapitalization opportunities
should the company fail. In practice, studies show that startups do not
32
seem to consider sale to NPEs as part of the exit plan. The rise of
NPE activity may change this in the future, but it implies that patents

28. Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 457, 474–75 (2012); see also
Lamoreaux & Sokoloff, supra note 3, at 12,690–91.
29. Henry R. Nothhaft & David Kline, Was Thomas Edison a Patent Troll?, IPWATCHDOG
(June 1, 2010, 6:03 PM), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2010/06/01/was-thomas-edison-a-patenttroll/id=10829 (describing several inventors that relied on licensing business models).
30. See infra notes 43–47 and accompanying text.
31. Risch, supra note 28, at 485–86. Of the patents originally obtained by companies, only
21 percent came from businesses dedicated to licensing. Id. About 75 percent of the business
entities were corporations, and of those, 17.5 percent received venture capital and 20 percent
were publicly traded. Id.; see also Colleen Chien, A Race to the Bottom, INTELL. ASSET MGMT.
MAG., Jan./Feb. 2012, at 13 fig. 2 (describing sources of patents).
32. See Stuart J.H. Graham, Robert P. Merges, Pam Samuelson & Ted Sichelman, High
Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255, 1281–83 (2009) (finding that venture capitalists do not closely
examine patent quality before investing); Nothhaft & Kline, supra note 29, at 492 (“NPEs may
have minimal investment-inducing benefits even if they marginally increase the likelihood of
investment.”).
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issued to startups all start out the same: owned by a productive
startup. They do not all end up in the same place, and where they end
up is a mix of product and NPE portfolios: some are held until they
expire, some are held until the startup becomes large, some are held
while the startup remains small, some are sold while the startup is
operating, and some are sold when the startup fails.
Fourth, NPEs purchase and enforce many of their patents from
individuals. For example, 28 percent of the patents asserted by the
most litigious NPEs were originally obtained by individuals, as
compared with 14 percent of the patents asserted by individuals in all
33
U.S. litigation. Thus, NPEs take claims that would otherwise be
asserted separately and aggregate them into portfolios that may be
asserted simultaneously. This is not unlike what product companies
do. They too obtain their patents from individuals: their employees.
But company patents come preaggregated to the employer. By
purchasing patents from individuals and aggregating them, NPEs
create portfolios. However, rather than creating patent portfolios by
paying salaried employees, they simply buy them directly.
Although nonemployed individual inventors are usually
nonpracticing themselves, the United States has long had an ethos of
34
the individual inventor, just as it has for product companies. Indeed,
one study found that technology patents held by individuals at
issuance had a high patent value when compared with those held by
35
many product companies. Thus, many people are slower to criticize
individuals, even though they make no products.
For those patents in the portfolio that are litigated to judgment,
NPE-owned patents do not appear to be significantly lower in quality
than other litigated patents. About 28 percent of the judgments
completely invalidated NPE-owned patents, whereas 20 percent of all
36
judgments completely invalidated a patent. This means that NPE
33. See Risch, supra note 28, at 495–96; see also Sara Jeruss, Robin Feldman & Joshua
Walker, The America Invents Act 500: Effects of Patent Monetization Entities on U.S. Litigation,
11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 357, 376 (2012) (showing that NPE activity moves inversely with
individual litigation filings: when one goes up, the other goes down).
34. See, e.g., Christopher A. Cotropia, The Individual Inventor Motif in the Age of the
Patent Troll, 12 YALE J.L. & TECH. 52, 54 (2009) (“The garage inventor is as American as apple
pie. We enjoy stories of independent inventors, working against all odds to provide society with
amazing technological breakthroughs.” (footnote omitted)).
35. Kramer, supra note 10, at 485–86.
36. Risch, supra note 28, at 482. This comparison is also not completely appropriate. The
study of all patents counted orders that denied summary judgment. The NPE study did not
count such orders, which means the denominator was smaller, increasing the percentage.
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patents are not so much lower in quality that they are somehow
different from patents generally. To the extent there is a patent
quality problem, it is not limited to NPEs.
Finally, it is likely that NPEs will accept some amount of money
37
to settle a case; licensing is the business model after all. Of course,
the defendant-licensee may not be happy with the amount, but some
settlement amount is usually available. When productive companies
38
sue each other, plaintiffs may be unwilling to settle at any price.
Instead, they may demand an injunction. As productive companies
39
obtain more patents, the likelihood of an injunction increases.
Indeed, though many NPE patents are invalid, productive
companies have obtained invalid patents as well. Little separates the
quality of these patents other than the current owner.
B. Product-Company Patent Aggregation
Individuals have long assigned their patents to companies that
40
aggregate them. Usually, such patents come from employees who
assign inventions to their employers; the same is true for virtually
41
every university. As the number of employees and inventions grow,
so grows the number of patents. In fact, large companies have long
aggregated many more patents than small companies, although some
evidence suggests that large company aggregation includes a higher

37. See, e.g., Public Comment from Barry Leff, IPNav, to Fed. Trade Comm’n Patent
Assertion Entity Activities Workshop (Dec. 10, 2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/
comments/pae/pae-0010.pdf (“When such an operating company seeks sales injunctions against
competitors, it is because they want to increase their market share. When a PAE asserts a
patent, it’s not looking to stifle competition: it’s looking to get paid for its intellectual
property.”). In rare cases when the patent is exclusively licensed, the exclusive licensee might
enforce the patent and require an injunction.
38. See Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113
COLUM. L. REV., (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 46–47), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2269087 (discussing litigation and settlement differences among
NPEs and competitors).
39. See Charles Duhigg & Steve Lohr, The Patent, Used as a Sword, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8,
2012, at A1 (noting that “as patent portfolios have expanded, so have pressures to use them
against competitors”); cf. Richard Stallman, Let’s Limit the Effect of Software Patents, Since We
Can’t Eliminate Them, WIRED (Nov. 1, 2012, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/opinion/2012/11/
richard-stallman-software-patents (arguing that Apple may be the most dangerous patent
holder).
40. See, e.g., Lamoreaux & Sokoloff, supra note 3, at 12,690 (conducting a quantitative
analysis showing the increase in patent assignments over time).
41. See generally Peter Lee, Patents and the University, 63 DUKE L.J. 1, 36–49 (2013)
(documenting a shift from “academic exceptionalism” to universities’ embrace of patenting).
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proportion of lesser value patents when compared with small
42
companies.
One famous example is IBM, which has more patents than any
43
other company. IBM’s patenting activity created two advantages.
First, the company is rarely, if ever, sued for patent infringement by
44
its competitors. The reason is simple: any company that might sue
IBM for infringing a patent would face counterclaims for infringing
45
several IBM patents. The result is either no action or a cross-license
agreement between IBM and the other party. Second, IBM has used
its portfolio as a source of revenue. One example is its 1993 license of
46
all personal-computer patents to Dell for $293 million. IBM has
reportedly earned more than $10 billion in licensing, and some credit
the company’s intellectual property exploitation with its turnaround
47
in the early 1990s.
More recently, large companies have begun to acquire large
portfolios of patents from a variety of sources other than their own
employees such as individuals, acquired companies, and other large
companies. They have done so for three reasons. First, every patent
purchased by a productive company cannot be purchased by an NPE.
Thus, aggregation is a defense mechanism to avoid assertions by

42. See DIANA HICKS, CHI RESEARCH, INC., SMALL SERIAL INNOVATORS: THE SMALL
FIRM CONTRIBUTION TO TECHNICAL CHANGE 11 (2003), available at http://archive.sba.gov/
advo/research/rs225tot.pdf (finding that small firms generate a disproportionate number of
important patents as measured by citations); John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Who’s
Patenting What? An Empirical Exploration of Patent Prosecution, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2099, 2128
(2000) (reporting that 70 percent of patents are sought by large firms compared with 11 percent
by small firms).
43. Sarah Frier, IBM Granted Most U.S. Patents for 20th Straight Year, BLOOMBERG (Jan.
10, 2013, 9:05 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-10/ibm-granted-most-u-s-patentsfor-20th-straight-year.html.
44. See, e.g., Gary L. Reback, Patently Absurd, FORBES, June 24, 2002, at 44, 45–46. RPX
Corporation Data shows that IBM has been sued by nine operating companies since 2005, and
only one since 2009. Email from RPX Corp. to Michael Risch, Professor of Law, Villanova
Univ. Sch. of Law (June 3, 2013, 11:46 AM) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
45. See Colleen Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem
and Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 321–22 (2010) (“In defensive
contexts, patents are used to ward off suits, as well as to gain access to technology and to further
technological adaptation.”); Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 4, at 36 (noting the defensive
benefits of portfolios).
46. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1328 (2009). Indeed, this license
was an amendment to an earlier license that likely contemplated additional royalties. Id.
47. See, e.g., Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 4, at 47–48 (“This led not only to the
remarkable growth of the company’s patent portfolio, but also to a significantly reduced ratio of
research dollars spent to patents earned.”).
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others. The value of defensive aggregation is that every patent
purchased will not be used against it. Additionally, there is an
ongoing economic benefit to any purchaser who might be infringing a
patent: the avoided license fees. Of course, the purchase price is
simply a prepayment of those potential fees and defense costs.
Second, companies with too few patents to effectively defend
themselves from lawsuits filed by competitors have begun aggregating
48
patents to better defend themselves. There are several recent
examples. For example, a consortium including Microsoft, Apple, and
Oracle purchased patent portfolios from Novell and Nortel, two
49
former technology leaders, for $4.5 billion. In response, Google
(which had made its own bid of $900 million), published a blog post
50
essentially accusing the consortium of behaving like patent trolls.
Google then purchased Motorola Mobility for $12.5 billion in a deal
that most observers agreed was for Motorola’s mobile-phone patent
51
portfolio, which has since been asserted against Apple. In another
example, Yahoo recently sued Facebook for patent infringement,
much to the dismay of Yahoo employees who invented the subject
52
matter of the patents. In response, Microsoft purchased a large
portfolio of patents from America Online (AOL), and sold half of

48. See id. at 57 (“By contrast, firms lacking effective patent portfolios will find themselves
increasingly unable to reach beneficial accommodations with their more portfolio-rich
competitors, and will be forced to the more costly, more prolonged, and higher risk strategy of
patent litigation.”); id. at 56 (arguing that need for aggregation explains growth in small firm
patenting in the 1990s); see also Recent Patent Assignments, PATENTLY-O (Apr. 15, 2013),
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2013/04/recent-patent-assignments.html.
49. Elizabeth Woyke, An Insider on the Nortel Patent Auction and Its Consequences,
FORBES (July 7, 2011, 11:40 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/elizabethwoyke/2011/07/07/aninsider-on-the-nortel-patent-auction-and-its-consequences.
50. See David Drummond, When Patents Attack Android, GOOGLE BLOG (Aug. 4, 2011,
12:25 PM), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2011/08/when-patents-attack-android.html (“They
want to make it harder for manufacturers to sell Android devices. Instead of competing by
building new features or devices, they are fighting through litigation. This anti-competitive
strategy is also escalating the cost of patents way beyond what they’re really worth.”).
51. Evelyn M. Rusli & Claire Cain Miller, Google To Buy Motorola Mobility for $12.5
Billion, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Aug. 15, 2011, 9:16 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/
08/15/google-to-buy-motorola-mobility.
52. Michael J. de la Merced, As It Warned, Yahoo Sues Facebook over Patents, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK (Mar. 25, 2012, 4:48 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/03/12/yahoo-suesfacebook-over-patents. Software engineers generally do not favor the use of patents to limit
other software development. See, e.g., Andy Baio, A Patent Lie: How Yahoo Weaponized My
Work, WIRED (Mar. 13, 2012, 3:44 PM), http://www.wired.com/business/2012/03/opinion-baioyahoo-patent-lie.
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those patents to Facebook to use in defense against Yahoo. This
purchased aggregation is very similar to home-grown aggregation by
companies building portfolios through employees.
Third, and related to the first two points, defense against NPEs
54
and competitors allows a greater freedom to innovate. In fact, some
posit that a large portfolio improves a company’s ability to acquire
55
additional innovation in the form of patents and other development.
This also means that the company can enhance its licensing efforts by
including acquired patents in a portfolio along with patents developed
in-house.
Although scholars might lament a patent system that encourages
more and more aggregation, there is no question that the practice has
expanded, nor that it was ever limited to NPEs. As such, regulations
should apply to all aggregators.
II. PATENTS AND PORTFOLIOS AS SECURITIES
This Part considers whether patents and patent portfolios should
be considered securities. The analysis leads to three conclusions: (1)
portfolios, rather than individual patents, should be considered for
securities treatment; (2) the securities laws would bring regulatory
benefits not associated with patent laws, thereby justifying securities
treatment; and (3) portfolio transactions could meet the test
56
articulated in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co. (the Howey test) for securities,
though the argument probably better applies to portfolio licensing.
A. Patents vs. Portfolios
This Article focuses on patents aggregated into large portfolios.
Whereas the rules should arguably apply to individual patents and

53. Facebook Buys AOL Patents from Microsoft in $550m Deal, BBC (Apr. 23, 2012),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-17820851.
54. Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 4, at 34. For example, Parchomovsky and
Wagner discuss the growth of Gemstar, a productive company that at one point acquired TV
Guide through the acquisition of patents. Id. at 50–51.
55. See id. (“Thus, holding a patent portfolio can have a multiplier effect on the range of
innovations that can be accessed by the firm.”); see also Kitch, supra note 3, at 1739 (“[A]n
author or inventor, or their employers, will usually hold not one, but multiple rights, which will
often be interrelated. The assembly of a portfolio of multiple intellectual property rights is one
plausible way that an economic monopoly can be created. However, it is essential that firms are
able to obtain multiple rights. . . . A single patent claim, much less a single patent, often covers
only a small part of the technology needed to market a commercially competitive device.”).
56. SEC. v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
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patent portfolios in the same way, theory and practice imply that
57
portfolios should be treated differently than individual patents.
Individual patents are hotly contested, and their values turn on very
specific characteristics. Thus, regulating a patent as a security would
be like regulating a single share of stock as a security; it can be done,
but what’s the point? Potential buyers and licensees can perform due
58
diligence and challenge the patent as necessary. Although a single
patent may fall into the definition of security just as a single share
might, the costs of regulation are likely to outweigh the benefits that
securities regulation can offer in addition to patent law.
Portfolios, on the other hand, increase the patent-holder’s
leverage even if the additional patents are of dubious quality. The
owner can assert many claims, which make diligence and defense far
more costly. Further, even if one patent is removed from the equation
due to invalidity or noninfringement, there are many more patents in
the portfolio.
These features of portfolios have two effects. First, they are far
59
more efficient than single patents. One owner is the point of contact.
One license agreement can resolve disputes. Challenging an entire
portfolio is fruitless. Indeed, even the owner has a disincentive to sue
60
on the entire portfolio. Asserting five hundred, or even one
hundred, patents in a case is practically impossible. Second, the
increased costs and risk of damages may give portfolio owners
bargaining power that makes royalty extraction inefficient due to
61
hold-up problems.

57. See, e.g., Vincent Chiappetta, Patent Exhaustion: What’s It Good For?, 51 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 1087, 1133–35 (2011) (discussing differing approaches to patent exhaustion
when considered on a patent-by-patent basis versus the market as whole).
58. Others might even fund patent litigation as well. Jack Ellis, Patent Litigation as an Asset
Class, INTELL. ASSET MGMT. MAG., Nov./Dec. 2012, at 43, 44–45.
59. See Lemley & Melamed, supra note 38, at 42 (“Complementary inputs cost less when
they are acquired from a single supplier with market power than when the same inputs are
acquired from multiple suppliers, each of which has market power. Aggregation of patents that
are likely to confer some degree of market power in the hands of a single patent holder is
therefore likely, all other things equal, to reduce technology users’ costs.”).
60. See id. at 9 (“Patent aggregators file very few suits relative to their impact . . . .”).
61. Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV.
1991, 1995–96 (2007); see Michael A. Carrier, Patent Assertion Entities: Six Actions the Antitrust
Agencies Can Take, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., Jan. 2013, at 1, 2–3 (discussing the harm of
collecting patents by recounting IBM’s allegation of patent infringement against Sun Systems);
Lemley & Melamed, supra note 38, at 43–44 (discussing NPE disaggregation into shell
companies which may facilitate anticompetitive strategic action); Mark R. Patterson, Leveraging
Information About Patents: Settlements, Portfolios, and Holdups, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 483, 504
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Both of these features favor applying securities laws to patent
portfolios. To the extent that securities laws favor information
disclosure, more regulation is needed because portfolios do not lead
to the same types of diligence as individual patents. Securities laws
might provide an information-forcing function to provide information
about the portfolio. Further, to the extent that securities laws aid in
market formation, securities treatment may help create private
markets with better transparency and pricing mechanisms.
How might a portfolio be considered a security? As noted above,
portfolios are not traded like other securities. However, a portfolio
might be monetized in three ways that might parallel a “trade”:
62
Purchase. First, an entire portfolio may be purchased outright,
63
such as when Microsoft purchased 925 patents from AOL.
License. Second, a potentially infringing party might license a
portfolio, such as when Dell licensed the use patents from IBM.
Holding companies. Third, buyers may purchase shares in a
company or investment fund that asserts patents with or without a
promise not to assert. Thus, the company “holds” the patents, and
investors invest in the company’s stock. This comes closest to the
64
traditional notion of “securitization.” Publicly traded NPEs, like
Acacia, represent a portfolio held in a fund separate from any
promise not to sue; Google could buy shares in Acacia, but still be
sued by Acacia. Because Acacia is publicly traded, there is no
relationship between a potential infringer’s decision to invest in the
company and the decision to license patents owned by the company.
Intellectual Ventures (IV) shows the complexity that is added
when a portfolio is held by a privately financed company. Most
observers agree that IV has acquired more patents than any other
NPE, perhaps by far, and also that its corporate structure is very

(2013) (discussing the competitive advantage of large portfolios due to the increased difficulty
of evaluating infringement). But see Jiaqing “Jack” Lu, The Myths and Facts of Patent Troll and
Excessive Payment: Have Nonpracticing Entities (NPEs) Been Overcompensated?, 47 BUS.
ECON. 234, 242 (2012) (finding a lack of empirical evidence that NPEs are overcompensated).
62. This includes an exclusive license, which allows the licensee to enforce patents.
63. Facebook Buys AOL Patents from Microsoft in $550m Deal, supra note 53.
64. See Nikolic, supra note 3, at 401–04 (discussing “special purpose entities” that hold
securitized patents).
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65

complex. The company includes several funds that acquire and
66
license patents and also conducts its own research and development.
Potential infringers might obtain a license to some part of the
overall portfolio held by a fund. Those same potential infringers
might also invest in the fund, but there is more likely to be a
relationship between the licensing and investment decision as part of
the overall negotiation. If the licensee invests, then when the
company obtains a new patent, IV could also provide some of the
licensing royalties it receives as profits to that investor, just as it
would provide to other investors. If the investor has obtained a broad
enough license, then each additional patent acquisition might also
include a promise not to sue on the new patent, which acts as a type
of defensive strategy. It is no surprise, therefore, that large product
companies have been listed in court documents as interested parties
67
in IV patent litigation. It is also no surprise, though, that other
companies might simultaneously be investors and lawsuit defendants
if their licenses were more limited.
The third type of portfolios—those owned by holding
companies—are easily handled, because the investor purchases
corporate stock in the company that is no different than other
68
securities. The securities laws would apply in the same way, at least
69
as to investors in the holding company. But the first two categories
are not quite as analogous to stocks. Neither type is likely to be
offered to the public; most patent licenses are privately offered. Thus,
further analysis is necessary to determine if transactions in these
categories should be regulated like securities.

65. See Tom Ewing & Robin Feldman, The Giants Among Us, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV.
1, 3–7, http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/feldman-giants-among-us.pdf (detailing IV patents and
corporate structure).
66. Funds, INTELL. VENTURES, http://www.intellectualventures.com/index.php/about/funds
(last visited Aug. 19, 2013).
67. See Ewing & Feldman, supra note 65, at 39–40 (describing the parties in the IV
litigation).
68. See Nikolic, supra note 3, at 401–02 (describing how patents may be securitized by
placing them in a special purpose entity).
69. See, e.g., Pommer v. Medtest Corp., 961 F.2d 620, 623 (7th Cir. 1992) (applying
securities laws to a company whose sole asset was a patent intended to be sold to a third party);
Argentum Int’l, LLC v. Woods, 634 S.E.2d 195, 199 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (applying securities
laws to a company whose primary asset related to patent ownership).
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B. A Need for Securities Regulation
The policy of the securities laws meets goals that patent law
cannot reach. The securities laws are generally recognized to have
two primary purposes, primarily effected through disclosure and
penalties for false disclosure. First, they are intended to protect
70
buyers of securities. If information is false, buyers will be duped.
71
Second, they are intended to protect the markets for securities. If
information is unreliable, then markets will be unavailable. Thus, one
may ask whether patent buyers and licensees are the types of
purchasers that require protecting and whether patent markets, which
are primarily nonpublicly traded, can benefit from securities rules.
As discussed above, patent portfolios create leverage that may
72
require regulation. These portfolios can be extraordinarily efficient
at closing licensing transactions, but in the way that a bulldozer is
efficient at demolishing things. The efficiency may limit the ability to
challenge the portfolio, leaving any party approached by an
73
aggregator at the mercy of the portfolio owner. This, of course, is an
overstatement. Potential defendants defend infringement suits and
74
even file for declaratory relief on a regular basis.
Even so, however, some regulation might be beneficial to
enhance market integrity and limit overzealous aggregators by
requiring more disclosure. If implemented well, aggregators may
welcome such regulation because courts may be more likely to affirm
transactions in a regulated, high-integrity market.
One consideration is whether there are nonsecurities regulatory
schemes that might provide protection. There is little need for
securities laws if patent laws are sufficient. For example, in United
75
Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, the Supreme Court considered
whether housing cooperatives were securities. Though it did not rely
on them solely, the Court emphasized the extensive regulations
76
already applicable to the challenged housing cooperatives. Further,
70. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975).
71. Id.
72. See supra Part II.A.
73. See Gary L. Reback, Patently Absurd, FORBES (June 24, 2002),
http://www.forbes.com/asap/2002/0624/044_print.html (describing IBM’s portfolio-licensing
practices).
74. Chester Chuang, Offensive Venue: The Curious Use of Declaratory Judgment To Forum
Shop in Patent Litigation, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1065, 1067 (2012).
75. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
76. Id. at 842–44.
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the existence of other regulation may not be enough to exempt a
transaction from the securities laws, either, if the regulation is
77
insufficient to protect buyers and sellers or the market.
The lack of alternative regulation—at least the type of regulation
provided by securities treatment—favors the application of securities
law. Patent law provides little alternative regulation. To be sure, there
are several regulatory provisions in patent law, but each of these
relate to challenging the validity of a single patent. Other than
78
granting the inalienable right to challenge a patent’s validity, these
regulations are not intended to protect buyers or licensees of patents,
let alone patent portfolios. The patent-aggregation market is
completely unregulated by patent law. As a result, securities law may
be necessary to protect market participants. Patent law barely
addresses market transactions.
Regulators have considered whether antitrust law should apply
to aggregator hold-up, but such laws will be unlikely to provide the
same benefits as securities laws. First, one must prove that each
transaction is anticompetitive. Second, the remedies are more of a
bludgeon than a regulator. Third, that law is primarily proscriptive
and would not provide a framework for each and every transaction,
nor would it aid in market formation.
C. Securities and the Howey Test
79

Securities are defined broadly in the Securities Act of 1933 (the
1933 Act) as
any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, bond, debenture,
evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in
any profit-sharing agreement, . . . investment contract, . . . fractional
undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any put, call,
straddle, option, or privilege on any security, . . . or warrant or right
to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.80

The highlighted terms, “profit-sharing agreement” and
“investment contract,” emphasize that a security is essentially any
investment in a forward-looking venture in which the profit comes
77. See SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d 536, 541–42 (1996) (holding that securities laws
might apply to viatical settlements, even though state laws regulate them already).
78. See, e.g., Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 671 (1969) (allowing licensees to challenge
patents even when they agree not to do so).
79. Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2012).
80. Id. (emphasis added).
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81

from the work of others. The Supreme Court has noted that
82
securities should be defined broadly, with substance trumping form.
In other words, according to a former Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) senior attorney and commissioner of California
corporations, “the statutory plan is apparently designed to regulate
interests which secure capital for a venture, from investors, in
83
exchange for a ‘piece of the action.’”
Obtaining a patent from the government does not create a
security; securities only exist when others obtain an interest in the
84
original asset. Thus, IBM’s portfolio of patents would not constitute
a security until sold or licensed to another company.
Courts use the Howey test as the generally accepted starting
point to determine whether an arrangement constitutes the sale of a
security. In Howey, purchasers bought an interest in land, coupled
85
with a contract for development of that land to grow oranges. In
exchange, the investors were entitled to a portion of the profits from
86
the sale of oranges. The Supreme Court held that this was an
investment contract within the 1933 Act:
The respondent companies are offering something more than fee
simple interests in land, something different from a farm or orchard
coupled with management services. They are offering an
opportunity to contribute money and to share in the profits of a
large citrus fruit enterprise managed and partly owned by
87
respondents.

The Court identified the factors that define such a contract: (1)
an investment of money with the expectation of profit, (2) in a

81. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298–99 (1946).
82. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) (“[F]orm should be disregarded for
substance and emphasis should be on economic reality.”); see also United Hous. Found., Inc. v.
Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 848 (1975) (refusing to find that shares of stock entitling the holder to
lease apartments are securities merely because the interest was called “stock”).
83. John G. Sobieski, What is a Security?, 25 MERCER L. REV. 381, 385 (1974).
84. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 1.6 (6th ed. 2009)
(“The first difference is that securities are created rather than produced. Securities can be issued
in unlimited amounts and virtually without any costs since securities are nothing in themselves
but rather represent only an interest in something else. Therefore, an important focus of
securities regulation is assuring that when securities are created and offered to the public,
investors have an accurate idea of what that ‘something else’ is and how much of an interest in
that ‘something else’ the security in question represents.”).
85. Howey, 328 U.S. at 295–97.
86. Id. at 296.
87. Id. at 299.
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common enterprise, (3) coming solely from the efforts of a promoter
88
or third party. However, the fact that patents might have intrinsic
value themselves does not appear to be an impediment to treating
their sale as securities, as the Court noted: “If [the investment
contract] test be satisfied, it is immaterial whether the enterprise is
speculative or non-speculative or whether there is a sale of property
89
with or without intrinsic value.”
Patent portfolio transactions appear to satisfy the test, though
individual patent transactions do not. The overarching theme is that
patent portfolios are different from nonsecurity investment purchases
(like precious minerals) for two primary reasons. First, they are part
of a common enterprise: everyone buys and licenses the same
portfolio, not different ones. Second, the value of each portfolio is
determined in large part by the actions of a seller or licensor. The
following subsections apply the Howey framework to patents.
1. Investment of Money with the Expectation of Profit. The
Howey test requires that securities involve an investment of money
with the expectation of profit. Because the purchase of patents and
patent portfolios involve payments, it may seem obvious that there is
an investment of money, but such an analysis would be deceptively
simple. Typically, purchase of an asset for use is not considered an
investment: “By contrast, when a purchaser is motivated by a desire
to use or consume the item purchased—‘to occupy the land or to
90
develop it themselves,’ . . .—the securities laws do not apply.”
Thus, in holding that “shares” in a cooperative housing
development were not securities, the Court recognized what was
missing:
[T]he right to receive ‘dividends contingent upon an apportionment
of profits.’ Nor do they possess the other characteristics traditionally
associated with stock: they are not negotiable; they cannot be
pledged or hypothecated; they confer no voting rights in proportion
to the number of shares owned; and they cannot appreciate in value.
In short, the inducement to purchase was solely to acquire
91
subsidized low-cost living space; it was not to invest for profit.

88. Id. at 299–300.
89. Id. at 301.
90. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852–53 (1975) (citation omitted)
(quoting Howey, 328 U.S. at 300).
91. Id. at 851 (citation omitted) (quoting Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 339 (1967)).
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But patents are different. They are negotiable, even if not in the
Uniform Commercial Code sense. At the very least, they are
alienable and might be pledged and hypothecated. They can
appreciate in value as they are litigated and defended from attack.
Thus, patents are a strange mix of use and investment.
Technically, the patent itself provides no right to use any technology.
Rather, it only allows the right to exclude others from practicing the
92
patent. Even if every competitor were excluded from infringing the
patent, the patent holder might still be barred by others who own
competing patents on the same technology. Viewed this way, a patent
can never be for personal use, but only for the value obtained by
excluding others—an investment.
In short, the inducement to purchase a portfolio will often be
expected profits. As a result, Howey’s profit expectation will most
likely be satisfied for patent buyers, and especially for aggregators,
who have no reason to purchase patents but for profit.
Similarly, patent holders may find financial investors who
contribute money toward the purchase and/or enforcement of
patents, but who do not obtain any license or ownership of the patent
portfolio. If these investors purchased stock in a company or
membership in an LLC, then they would surely qualify as securities
purchasers. The same should be true even if there is no formal
organization associated with the investment; the form of the
investment may differ, but the profit expectation associated with the
financial contribution is the same.
On the other hand, when parties merely license a portfolio from
the owner (rather than purchase or finance it), a more difficult
question of investment arises. After all, one infringes a patent by
93
“using” the invention and, as a result, licensors often grant licensees
the right to use the invention. As discussed below, to avoid patent
misuse allegations, when aggregators license large portfolios, they
license the right to future use of the patent rather than simply release
94
past infringement. Thus, facially, licensees might be considered
patent “users” rather than “investors.”

92. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006) (“[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell,
or sells any patented invention, within the United States . . . during the term of the patent . . .
infringes the patent.”).
93. Id.
94. See infra Section III.B.2.
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However, property theory implies that a license is a type of
95
ownership interest, rather than simply a contract. Further, economic
reality implies that licensees may also invest with a profit expectation.
In the rare but easy case, the value of a license will be predicated on
the sales efforts of others, like a franchise agreement. When the
license is predicated on the sales efforts of others, it is more likely to
96
be considered a security. After all, the licensee intends to profit on
the sales of a patented product.
The more common case—litigation settlement or avoidance—
still has a profit motive, even though the licensee is paying money
with no expectation of a future return payment by the patent owner.
The profit from the payment is the license itself—the use of the
patented invention. If the patent is invalidated, the license turns out
to be worthless.
A license fee—especially an up-front fee—is a payment made to
fund a patent-holder’s business, even if the patent is later found
invalid or noninfringed. Thus, there is a risk that a licensee will
overpay for an unnecessary license. Though licensees need not pay
future license fees after a patent is invalidated, neither are they
entitled to a refund of past fees paid—fees that need not have been
97
paid in the first place because the license benefit was illusory.
To the extent that patent settlements are viewed as nuisance
payments, this might not be much of a concern. After all, a license
buys peace, not use of the “worthless” patent. But even a nuisance
payment gives a licensee an edge against competitors who refuse to
make such payments. Whereas a licensee may continue doing
business in peace, the competitors must spend time and money
defending a patent-infringement case, with the risk of damages in a
loss. This benefit disappears if a licensed patent is invalidated.

95. See Christopher M. Newman, A License Is Not a “Contract Not To Sue”: Disentangling
Property and Contract in the Law of Copyright Licenses, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1101, 1141–42 (“[T]he
basic building block of all license interests—the use-privilege—is not a contractual duty, but a
property interest conveyed in exactly the same manner used in the realm of tangible
property.”).
96. See SEC v. Aqua-Sonic Prods. Corp., 524 F. Supp. 866, 877–78 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(holding that patent licenses were securities in which sales of patented goods were performed by
third parties other than the licensee).
97. Cf. George D. Kappus Jr., The Franchise as a Security: Application of the Securities
Laws to Owner-Operated Franchise, 11 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 228, 237 (1970) (“After the
franchise is in operation, the franchisee’s control over his property is illusory, and thus the profit
of the franchise depends upon the efforts of the franchisor.”).
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This effect may also be reversed. If a licensor obtains one
licensee, but fails to seek licenses from the licensee’s competitors,
then the licensee’s investment might be less valuable. The licensee’s
costs have increased when others’ have not. This relates to efforts of
the licensor, as discussed in more detail below.
Courts may not be receptive to these arguments of “negative”
profits associated with licensing. For example, the Supreme Court
was skeptical of treating tax deductions and rental rate discounts as
98
profits. On the other hand, some cases have held that fluctuation in
value or loss of investment might be considered an investment for
99
100
profit. The court in SEC v. Life Partners, Inc. summarized this
issue nicely:
The Court’s general principle we think, is only that the expected
profits must, in conformity with ordinary usage, be in the form of a
financial return on the investment, not in the form of consumption.
This principle distinguishes between buying a note secured by a car
101
and buying the car itself.

The question remains whether a patent or a patent license is
more like the car or the note secured by the car. As in Life Partners,
the purchase of a patent for aggregation must surely be considered a
purchase for return on investment rather than current consumption.
Companies are not buying patents in bulk for their individual value.
A portfolio license is a more difficult case, but may also satisfy the
investment-return test. Applied to a hybrid arrangement, in which
others provide funds to pursue patent-infringement cases brought by
102
the patent holder, such pooling might be considered a security.

98. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 855–56 (1979).
99. See SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 394 (2004) (“Thus, when we held that ‘profits’ must
‘come solely from the efforts of others,’ we were speaking of the profits that investors seek on
their investment, not the profits of the scheme in which they invest. We used ‘profits’ in the
sense of income or return, to include, for example, dividends, other periodic payments, or the
increased value of the investment.” (quoting SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299
(1946))); Guidry v. Bank of LaPlace, 954 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1992) (“Expectation of profit
carries with it a connotation of potential appreciation or depreciation in value of the investment
contract. That is, the arrangement must be so structured as to contemplate at the outset, some
risk—either that the investor could lose his investment, or that the value of his return could
fluctuate.”).
100. SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
101. Id. at 543.
102. See B.J. Tannenbaum, Jr., SEC No-Action Letter, [1986] Sec. Reg. L. Rep. (BNA) 2975
(Dec. 4, 1986).
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2. Common Enterprise. The Howey test next requires a common
enterprise. When determining whether an investment scheme is a
103
security, courts also look to the “promoter” and the “investor.” The
promoter seeks money from the investor in a common enterprise in
exchange for some future payout. Courts look to two different types
of common enterprise: horizontal and vertical commonality.
Horizontal commonality is best demonstrated by typical
company stock. Many people own a piece of a single asset, and profits
104
in the underlying asset are distributed based on share of ownership.
Assets with horizontal commonality are almost always considered a
security if the other requirements are met.
Vertical commonality is less stringent; it requires only that the
105
profits of the investor are tied to the fortunes of the promoter. With
vertical commonality, courts have split on how closely the fortunes
must be tied. Some courts require strict correlation, whereby the
106
profits of the investor match the profits of the promoter. This view
appears to have been largely rejected. Most courts now require only a
loose link, such that the investor can make some money even if the
107
promoter makes much more. Thus, the Supreme Court ruled that a
payphone lease contract was a security, even though the investor was
108
promised a fixed return.
Prediction markets, in which people bet on the outcomes of
events that they do not control, like elections or the Academy
109
Awards, are the loosest of vertical enterprises. Indeed, the payout
has nothing to do with the promoter, and is related only to a third103. Howey, 328 U.S. at 300 (“Thus all the elements of a profit-seeking business venture are
present here. The investors provide the capital and share in the earnings and profits; the
promoters manage, control and operate the enterprise.”).
104. Rodney L. Moore, Defining an “Investment Contract”: The Commonality Requirement
of the Howey Test, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1057, 1062 (1986).
105. Id. at 1065.
106. See Brodt v. Bache & Co., 595 F.2d 459, 461 (9th Cir. 1978) (“Here, strong efforts by
Bache will not guarantee a return nor will Bache’s success necessarily mean a corresponding
success for Brodt.”).
107. See Long v. Shultz Cattle Co., 881 F.2d 129, 141 (5th Cir. 1989) (“Rather, the necessary
interdependence may be demonstrated by the investors’ collective reliance on the promoter’s
expertise even where the promoter receives only a flat fee or commission rather than a share in
the profits of the venture.”).
108. See SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 397 (2004) (“The fact that investors have bargained
for a return on their investment does not mean that the return is not also expected to come
solely from the efforts of others.”).
109. See Justin Wolfers & Eric Zitzewitz, Prediction Markets, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 2004,
at 107, 110–11.
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party outcome. If such an outcome is an election, the underlying
“asset” is likely a product that is regulated as a commodity; however,
if the underlying prediction constitutes earnings in a company, the
110
prediction market may constitute a security.
To the extent that courts accept loose vertical commonality,
111
patent sales are more likely to be considered investment contracts.
Work by the patent seller will determine the patent’s validity and
scope, and that work will affect the value to the downstream buyer.
As discussed below, a court must accept a view of securities in which
the seller’s work came before the sale rather than after it, but some
112
case law supports this interpretation. Indeed, the outcome can rely
on a third-party event—the validity of the patent. This event will
drive the fortunes of the investor regardless of whether the
promoter’s efforts are included, so long as the promoter provides the
113
asset.
In contrast, a nonexclusive patent license may be more
counterintuitively considered an investment in a common enterprise.
Facially, a license is usually viewed as a damages payment, and there
114
is no expected revenue stream from it. Despite appearances,
however, the outcome and value of the license are still tied to the
115
fortunes of the promoter. For example, if a patent is found invalid,
then all other licensees may void their licenses and stop paying. This

110. See, e.g., George R. Neumann, CFTC No-Action Letter (June 18, 1993), available at
http://www.cftc.gov/files/foia/repfoia/foirf0503b004.pdf; see also Tom W. Bell, Prediction
Markets for Promoting the Progress of Science and the Useful Arts, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 37,
78 (2006) (arguing that prediction markets are not securities in part because they pit traders
against each other, rather than in a common enterprise to amass investment).
111. See, e.g., SEC v. Brigadoon Scotch Distrib., Ltd., 388 F. Supp. 1288, 1291–92 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (holding that there was commonality when the promoters used their expertise to find rare
coins to be purchased by investors).
112. See infra Part II.C.3.
113. See Caldwell v. State, 95 S.W.3d 563,568 (Tex. App. 2002) (“An investor in a
commodities account who establishes that he or she relied solely on the investment advice of a
promoter satisfies the ‘solely from the efforts of others’ requirement.”).
114. Patent licenses are often viewed as an alternative to (and settlement of) potential
litigation. As such, the payments made under license agreements are an alternative to potential
damages (and defense) payments made in litigation. See generally John Kenneth Felter &
Samuel Brenner, Settlement Evidence and Patent Damages, TRIAL EVIDENCE (Am. Bar Ass’n),
July 2013, at 1, available at http://www.ropesgray.com/kenfelter/~/media/Files/articles/2013/07/
ABA%20-%20TrialEvidence_ArticleReprint_FelterandBrenner.ashx.
115. Indeed, such payments are declared as restoring goodwill rather than as income. Tax
Issues and Opportunities in Technology Litigation Judgments and Settlements, WNTS INSIGHTS
(PricewaterhouseCoopers), Oct. 2, 2012, at 1, 1 (discussing treatment of damage payments as
goodwill restoring value of damaged patent asset).
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means that, for ongoing royalty payments, the value of the license
increases (through avoided costs) if the profits of the promoter
decrease.
Furthermore, if a fixed license fee was paid and the entire
portfolio is invalidated, then the license fee was paid in vain—the
license is worthless. Here too, the value of the license is still tied to
the profits of the patentee. This loose connection is still a
commonality—even if it is reversed from usual expectations. Thus, a
license can be a security similar to a put option, in which the value of
the option increases as the share price decreases.
A related issue is division of ownership. When ownership is
undivided, there can be no common enterprise. This is one reason
why sales of homes and businesses, even for investment, are not
generally considered securities. For example, the 1933 Act requires
that interests in mineral rights must be fractional undivided
116
interests. Thus, the question is whether patent rights must be
fractional in a common enterprise.
If divided interest implies a security, then licenses might be
considered a security, though outright purchases would not. This
seems counter to the more obvious view that a portfolio sale is a
security and a license is not. Then again, it probably strengthens the
argument that nonexclusive licenses, though nonrivalrous, each
constitute an interest in a common enterprise—the patent. Like
mineral rights, if one promises benefits from the rights while another
continues to own the interest, an investment contract is created. This
is different from standard use assets, like a car or house, because the
promised benefit is to be provided by the seller.
3. From the Efforts of Others. The Howey test’s requirement that
investments come solely from the efforts of others has been loosened
117
through the years; currently, most courts will accept profits made
through the efforts of others, even if the investor has expended some
116. See Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2012) (defining securities to
include any “fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights”).
117. See United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 n.16 (1975) (noting the
relaxation of the requirement without ruling on same); Miriam R. Albert, The Howey Test
Turns 64: Are the Courts Grading this Test on a Curve?, 2 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 1, 19
(2011) (“Lower courts have considered whether ‘solely’ means ‘only’ in their articulation of the
Howey test, and some courts have eased the rigidity of the need to have the profits derived
solely from the efforts of others by including profits that come ‘primarily,’ ‘substantially,’ or
‘predominantly’ from the efforts of others. . . . The Supreme Court itself softened its stance and
seemingly endorsed a more relaxed standard . . . .”).
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effort. There is a limit to the amount of efforts tolerated by the
investor, of course. Franchise agreements, like locally owned
McDonald’s or Ford dealerships, are usually not considered
securities. They depend in large part on the operations of the
investor, even if the promoter dictates many of the franchise terms
(like the products, pricing, advertising, trademarks, and other
119
company-wide properties). Thus, franchises usually fail the “from
the efforts of others” prong because their success is based on the
efforts of the investor.
Based on this, a license better fits the requirement than a sale. In
a portfolio sale, the success depends on the buyer’s enforcement
efforts. In a portfolio license, the success depends on the seller’s
(licensor’s) efforts to maintain validity and license to other entities.
But even if one accepts that the efforts need not be solely from
the efforts of others, like in a portfolio sale, it is not clear when those
efforts must be made. Can one sell a security in which the profits are
to come from the past efforts of the promoter? This would seem to
best fit initial patent sales, because the original patentee performed
the efforts necessary to make the patent valuable, such as obtaining
the patent, convincing the patent examiner that the invention was
novel, and disclosing any harmful prior art. Changes in patent license
value, on the other hand, will most likely be most affected by
activities taking place after the license investment. The patentholder’s aggressiveness in enforcing the patents, as well as the
strength of its defense regarding the validity of the patents, will affect
120
license value in addition to the efforts of the original inventor.

118. See SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d 536, 545 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (stating the test as
“predominantly” through the efforts of others); SEC v. Int’l Loan Network, Inc., 968 F.2d 1304,
1308 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding that an investment contract satisfied the third prong of Howey
where the profits were expected to arise “at least predominantly from the efforts of others”);
Goodman v. Epstein, 582 F.2d 388, 408 n.59 (7th Cir. 1978) (holding that the investor’s
participation in arranging financing and proximity to the “management circle” made the
investor’s “Limited Partnership interest” an investment contract); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner
Enters., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973) (stating that the test requires “the efforts made by
those other than the investor are the undeniably significant ones, those essential managerial
efforts which affect the failure or success of the enterprise”); Blackwell v. Bentsen, 203 F.2d 690,
693 (5th Cir. 1953) (holding that the transaction constituted an investment contract when the
investor gave binding marketing instructions to the promoter).
119. See Kappus, supra note 97, at 234 (“However, in small franchises the owners and their
families usually provide labor. Although these franchisees generally need the most protection, it
is more difficult to apply the Supreme Court definition to this arrangement.”).
120. Furthermore, treating portfolios as securities might create a fiduciary duty to increase
license value just as company management owes to shareholders. See Stephen Bainbridge, Case
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The courts are split. Some hold that prior efforts do not create a
security, whereas others hold that prior efforts are sufficient to satisfy
the statutory definition. In one case, the court held that work to find
silver investments and an offer to store silver purchased by investors
did not constitute a security because the efforts of the promoter
(identification of the silver) came before the sale of the asset, and the
121
storage was simply a ministerial act. Another case focused on postsale efforts; the selection of real estate for sale was considered a sale
of securities because the individual sales were coupled with promises
122
to develop the lots after the investment.
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit made a similar ruling
123
in Life Partners.
There, the alleged security was a viatical
settlement—a life insurance policy purchased for a terminally ill
patient. The court ruled that because the selection of patients and
policies occurred before others invested, such settlements could not
124
be securities. Instead, any failure in the selection would be solved by
common-law measures because the securities laws are not intended to
cure all fraud, but rather only that fraud relating to future efforts of
125
promoters and others.
Although this line of cases is well within the bounds of reason, it
seems slightly out of step with the current application of securities
126
laws. So many of the requirements associated with securities laws
relate to sales of securities based on improper past actions. Reporting
requirements involve past financial results, not future projections.
Initial public offering documents do list future risk factors, but most
127
of the disclosures relate to past and current activities. If those
Law on the Fiduciary Duty of Director To Maximize the Wealth of Corporate Shareholders,
PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (May 5, 2012), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professor
bainbridgecom/2012/05/case-law-on-the-fiduciary-duty-of-directors-to-maximize-the-wealth-ofcorporate-shareholders.html. However, operation of such a duty is ambiguous; in some cases
license value might be maximized by invalidation of the patent. It is unlikely that courts will
impose fiduciary duties in such cases.
121. Noa v. Key Futures, Inc., 638 F.2d 77, 79–80 (9th Cir. 1980).
122. McCown v. Heidler, 527 F.2d 204, 211 (10th Cir. 1975).
123. Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 547–48.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 548.
126. According to one reviewer, more than one hundred articles have opined about whether
viatical settlements are securities. Albert, supra note 117, at 22 n.105. Seventeen states have now
amended their securities laws to explicitly include viatical settlements as securities. Id. at 32–33.
127. Securities Act of 1933 §§ 7, 10, Sched. A, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77g, 77j, 77aa (2012) (listing
information to be disclosed in a registration statement and prospectus, including balance sheets,
profit and loss statements, and past contracts).
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disclosures are false, it is considered fraud. Stock fraud almost always
relates to some event that occurs prior to a sale. Indeed, the Supreme
Court has ruled that there can be no cause of action if one did not
actually buy or sell a security in reliance on a misstatement; simply
128
holding on to a security that falls in value is insufficient. These rules
imply that past efforts must have some influence on the profits or
value of an investment. Otherwise, why should they matter? Do we
really expect that purchasers will have a better ability to evaluate past
actions than current and future actions?
These concerns led to a division in the courts. More recent
decisions have held that preinvestment efforts satisfy the Howey
129
test. For example, at least one federal court of appeals has ruled
130
that viatical settlements are, in fact, securities. There, the court
rejected the test in Life Partners:
While it may be true that the ‘solely on the efforts of the
promoter or a third party’ prong of the Howey test is more easily
satisfied by post-purchase activities, there is no basis for excluding
pre-purchase managerial activities from the analysis. . . . Courts have
found investment contracts in which significant efforts included the
pre-purchase exercise of expertise by promoters in selecting or
negotiating the price of an asset in which investors would acquire an
131
interest.

A vast majority of state courts have agreed, and treat viatical
132
investments as securities.
Thus, a key “efforts of others” issue is how much control the
seller has in determining patent portfolio value. Arguably, if the
133
buyer maintains all control, then the sale would not be a security.
On the other hand, the fact that the buyer is participating in the
128. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 749 (1975).
129. See, e.g., Wuliger v. Eberle, 414 F. Supp. 2d 814, 819–21 (N.D. Ohio 2006); SEC v.
Tyler, No. 3:03-CV-0282-P, 2002 WL 32538418, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 21, 2002); see also SEC v.
Brigadoon Scotch Distrib., Ltd., 388 F. Supp. 1288, 1291–92 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (holding that the
sale of coins based on expertise exercised before purchase is a security).
130. SEC v. Mut. Benefits Corp., 408 F.3d 737, 745 (11th Cir. 2005).
131. Id. at 743–44.
132. Joseph J. Rotunda & Mogey Lovelle, From Stocks and Bonds Through Betting on
Death: The Applicability of Securities Laws and the Regulation of New and Creative Investments,
THE ADVOC., Summer 2012, at 58, 60.
133. Cf. State v. Heath, 153 S.E. 855, 858 (N.C. 1930) (holding that an exclusive copyright
license was not a security when the licensee had control over the exploitation of the copyrighted
work); State v. Williams, 563 P.2d 1270, 1271–72 (Wash. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that a
fractional ownership interest in a patent is a security because of its small size).
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exploitation may be irrelevant to the determination of patents as a
134
security. After all, the validity of the patent and its general
application (the breadth of the claims) lie within the control of the
seller, even if that control was exercised presale. If the seller
maintains control over the key issues of validity, the buyer’s
participation in asserting the patent for infringement would be
relevant not to whether the patent was a security, but instead to
whether the patent was offered to the public or sold in a private
placement.
Finally, the seller maintains control over whom it approaches for
licenses. The value of one licensee’s purchase will be affected by
which of the licensee’s competitors face enforcement, which
competitors enter into license agreements, and which competitors are
135
left alone. All of these choices are in the seller’s control—post
sale—not the buyer’s control. In fact, the “effort of others” prong is
more closely met in the licensing scenario. There, the seller remains
in the picture, obtaining other licensees, defending the patents, and so
forth. In the portfolio-sale scenario, the seller exits the picture, and is
no longer involved with the ongoing enterprise. This implies that
licenses more closely behave like securities than sales do.
D. Licenses and Risk Capital
If it seems odd that a license might be considered a security,
there is judicial precedent supporting this proposition. In Silver Hills
136
Country Club v. Sobieski, the California Supreme Court ruled that a
nonownership license to use a country club, despite the payment of
137
monthly dues, constituted a security. As the court there noted:
Petitioners are soliciting the risk capital with which to develop a
business for profit. . . . [Section 25008 of the California Corporations
134. See SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973) (holding
that an investment in a plan that required active sales efforts of the buyer was a security and
noting that “the word ‘solely’ should not be read as a strict or literal limitation on the definition
of an investment contract, but rather must be construed realistically, so as to include within the
definition those schemes which involve in substance, if not form, securities”); Brigadoon Scotch,
388 F. Supp. at 1291–92 (holding that sale of coins constituted a security even though the buyer
held the investment asset, coins, after purchase).
135. See Charles W. Shifley, Industry Perspectives on Patent Damages Including the
Damages Component of Settlement Negotiations, A.B.A, http://www.ftp.abanet.org/litigation/
committees/intellectual/articles.html (last visited Aug. 19, 2013) (discussing the “greater interest
of industry defendants to have parity with their competitors than in their absolute costs”).
136. Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 361 P.2d 906 (Cal. 1961).
137. Id. at 906–07.

RISCH IN PRINTER (FN CORRECTION) (DO NOT DELETE)

120

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

9/18/2013 8:26 AM

[Vol. 63:89

Code, which defines the term “security,”] is as clearly applicable to
the sale of promotional memberships in the present case as it would
be had the purchasers expected their return in some such familiar
138
form as dividends.

The Silver Hills Country Club case adopted what is now a well139
recognized, though not universally used, test: the “risk capital” test.
The test asks whether there is a risk that the original payment will not
140
be realized in a benefit from the venture. As the court noted, “The
purchaser’s risk is not lessened merely because the interest he
purchases is labelled [sic] a membership. Only because he risks his
capital along with other purchasers can there be any chance that the
141
benefits of club membership will materialize.”
The risk-capital test is not widely used in federal courts. Indeed,
142
the Supreme Court has rejected it. However, it is a used by some
143
state courts, often in conjunction with the Howey test. As such, it
144
provides an analytical framework that supplements the Howey test.
This framework aids how one might assess patents as securities.
Applied to patent purchasing, the risk capital is for the purchase of a
145
risky asset. The purchase price—and any royalties—are at risk
138. Id. at 908–09.
139. Dennis S. Corgill, Securities as Investments at Risk, 67 TUL. L. REV. 861, 868 (1993).
140. See id. at 815 (“It bears noting that the act extends even to transactions where capital is
placed without expectation of any material benefits. . . . Since the act does not make profit to
the supplier of capital the test of what is a security, it seems all the more clear that its objective
is to afford those who risk their capital at least a fair chance of realizing their objectives in
legitimate ventures whether or not they expect a return on their capital in one form or
another.”)
141. Silver Hills Country Club, 361 P.2d at 908; see also Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S.
56, 66–67 (1990) (discussing the family-resemblance test and an examination of motivations,
expectations, and distribution plans).
142. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 857 n.24 (1975).
143. See JOSEPH C. LONG, 12 BLUE SKY LAW §§ 2:80, 2:86 (2012) (describing the use of the
risk-capital test in California, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Michigan, Oregon, Tennessee,
Washington and other states).
144. See id.; see also SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 393–94 (2004) (explaining that the
Howey test is derived from state securities laws).
145. See United States v. Schaefer, 299 F.2d 625, 628 (7th Cir. 1962) (holding that the sale of
interest in profits from a patent is a security); People v. Shafer, 19 P.2d 861, 862 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1933) (holding that the sale of the right “to participate to the amount of his or her interest
in any future enterprises of any nature whatever which may grow out of or arise from said
invention or any letters patent which may be issued thereon” constituted a security under
California law). But see Schmoyer v. Van Hosen, 208 P. 554, 557 (Kan. 1922) (“If the purpose
[of the Kansas Blue Sky law] had been to require a permit for the sale of patent rights of a
speculative character we think it would have been indicated expressly or by clearer implication
than we find in the present statute.”).
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should the patent be invalidated or noninfringed. With respect to
licenses rather than purchases, the license fee might be considered an
up-front payment to use a patent and that payment becomes
worthless if the patent is invalid. Thus, the licensee faces the risk that
its competitors will not have to pay a similar fee to practice the
patent, and that its license fee did not really buy anything, given that
the patent is no longer valid. Further, the portfolio’s value is largely in
the hands of the seller, which separates patent portfolios from other
speculative purchases.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF PATENT-PORTFOLIO SECURITIES
Treating patent portfolios like securities will lead to two primary
changes in how we think about patent transactions. First, the
securities laws will apply to patent transactions to increase market
integrity. Thus, transactions must be exempted from the rules, or else
be subject to registration rules. It turns out that most transactions
likely will be exempt, but some transactions—the ones most needing
regulatory protection—will fall under the registration requirements.
Furthermore, securities laws bring fraud rules, even for exempt
transactions, and those rules will protect portfolio buyers and
licensees. This Article considers federal laws only, although state
securities laws might also apply.
Second, securities treatment might spur improved pricing
methods to aid market transactions. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street
147
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) requires
that certain private transactions be reported in clearinghouses; even if
the transactions are exempt from registration requirements, public
knowledge of licenses will have future negotiation and price setting.
Taking this a step further, treating patent portfolios as securities will
help focus participants on the development of objective and efficient
pricing strategies rather than on individual patent validity.

146. See, e.g., Kemmerer v. Weaver, 445 F.2d 76, 79 (7th Cir. 1971) (“The whole underlying
format of the arrangement was that the purchaser of individual beavers was to put up the money
and then ‘sit back and let nature take its course’ or, more precisely, to ‘let things ride while (his)
herd builds up and up and up’, hoping ultimately to ‘sell the herd (or part of it), bank the profits
and enjoy long-term capital gains.’”). The court in Kemmerer held that the sale of beavers was a
security. Id. But see Copeland v. Hill, 680 F. Supp. 466, 469 (D. Mass. 1988) (holding that the
sale of rare coins was not a security).
147. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).

RISCH IN PRINTER (FN CORRECTION) (DO NOT DELETE)

122

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

9/18/2013 8:26 AM

[Vol. 63:89

A. Market Integrity
If patent portfolios are securities, then their purchase and sale
should be regulated like other securities. This implicates several key
aspects of securities regulation related to disclosure and market
integrity.
1. Public and Exempt Offerings. In general, securities must not
148
be sold to the public unless they are registered with the SEC, an
expensive and time-consuming process. Furthermore, public sale
requires public reporting of revenues and expenses associated with
149
the security, something that many patent aggregators may be
unhappy to do. On the other hand, such reporting would likely aid in
setting efficient pricing, as discussed in the next subsection. Even with
the benefits of reporting, however, if every portfolio required
registration, many efficiency benefits of securities treatment might be
lost.
In the alternative, some sales are exempt from the registration
requirement. The remainder of this subsection discusses the available
exemptions. Most portfolio transactions will fall under an exemption,
though a few will not. An exemption would maintain fraud and
transparency benefits discussed below, but might avoid the costs of
registration.
a. Purely Private Transactions. Sales that are purely private are
150
exempt. Most portfolio transactions will likely fall under this
exemption. Sales and licenses usually occur in private, between two
companies, with a very small group of sophisticated potential buyers
and licensees. Even so, such sales may require steps to ensure that the
151
transaction remains private.

148. Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2012).
149. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 12, 13, 14 U.S.C. §§ 78l, 78m, 78n (2012).
150. Securities Act of 1933 §4(a)(2) (exempting “transactions by an issuer not involving any
public offering”).
151. See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125–27 (1953) (holding that exemption
depends in part on investor sophistication and information); E.F. Hutton & Co., SEC NoAction Letter, 18 Sec. Reg. L. Rep. (BNA) 171, 172 (Jan. 31, 1986) (noting that the existence of
prior substantive relationships with offerees is a factor in evaluating whether a general
solicitation has occurred); Use of Legends and Stop-Transfer Instructions as Evidence of NonPublic Offering, Securities Act Release No. 33-5121, 36 Fed. Reg. 1525 (Dec. 30, 1970) (noting
that the existence of an appropriate legend or stop-transfer instructions is a factor to be
considered in determining whether to grant an exemption); Letter of General Counsel,
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There are a few exceptions, however, that might push the
envelope. For example, a portfolio holder might send demand letters
152
to one thousand or ten thousand potential licensees. Such a letter
153
might be considered a public offer, and thus require registration.
Furthermore, the letter would likely be a public solicitation, which
154
violates SEC rules.
An alternate view is that such letters are not offers at all. The
letters might instead be considered settlement demands. The
“nonoffer” view would likely gain little traction. First, because patent
holders want to avoid declaratory-relief actions, the language of such
letters would almost certainly be framed in terms of a voluntary
155
license, not a demand. Second, the law looks to the substantive
156
relationship between the parties, not the form of the offer. As such,
sending many letters would likely be considered a “general
solicitation,” and thus a public offer.
It turns out that treating mass demand letters as a public offer is
a surprising benefit of treating portfolios as securities. Recently, small
companies (and others) have become concerned with receiving
157
demand letters sent to the masses. Commentators worry that such
demand letters take advantage of unsophisticated recipients who do
not know enough about the patents to evaluate risk or fairly
158
negotiate.
Securities Act Release No. 285, 11 Fed. Reg. 10953 (Jan. 24, 1935) (explaining the importance of
an issuer’s selection of and relationship with offerees).
152. See, e.g., Joe Mullin, Patent Trolls Want $1,000—for Using Scanners, ARS TECHNICA
(Jan. 2, 2013, 9:30 AM) http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/01/patent-trolls-want-1000-forusing-scanners (describing one particular entity that sent out “hundreds, if not thousands, of
copies of the same demand letter to small businesses”).
153. See SEC v. Tecumseh Holdings Corp., No. 03 Civ. 5490(SAS), 2009 WL 4975263, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding that an offeror’s nationwide cold-calling campaign was a general form
of solicitation that precluded exceptions under Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501–508 (2003)).
154. Risdall v. Brown-Wilbert, Inc., 753 N.W.2d 723, 726, 734 (Minn. 2008) (recalling that a
posting on the Internet constituted general advertising and solicitation).
155. Kristin Johnson Doyle, Patent Demand Letters: Avoiding Declaratory Judgment
Jurisdiction, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, Feb. 2010, at 30, available at http://www.iptoday.com/issues/
2010/02/patent-demand-letters-avoiding-declaratory-judgment-jurisdiction-part-2-2.asp.
156. E.F. Hutton & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 18 Sec. Reg. L. Rep. (BNA) at 172
(“Substantive relationships may be established with persons who have provided satisfactory
responses to questionnaires that provide Hutton with sufficient information to evaluate the
prospective offerees’ sophistication and financial circumstances.”).
157. Mullin, supra note 152.
158. See, e.g., Chien, supra note 22, at 1 (“Small companies and startups are more vulnerable
to failure than large, well-established companies, and the implications of this vulnerability as it
relates to patent demands are not well understood.”).
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Thus, treating mass demand letters as public offerings would
offer two benefits. First, the cost of registration with the SEC might
dissuade some portfolio holders from sending a demand letter, thus
159
limiting the deleterious effect of such demands. Second, to the
extent that such demands are the most expedient way to enforce the
patent, registration would require public disclosure regarding the
portfolio, including any challenges to the patents and any prior
licenses that might shed light on future license fees. An unfortunate
side effect of this information forcing, though, would be increased
costs passed on to licensees. Even so, the additional information and
disincentive to register in the first place may justify the registration
requirement.
160
But not all solicitations made to the public are public offerings.
Courts have held that private transactions can remain exempt, even if
they are initiated through public methods such as advertisement or
161
cold calling. The seller helps itself when it takes steps to ensure that
potential buyers would qualify as buyers with sufficient information
162
and sophistication. Because most portfolio purchasers and licensors
would qualify, most offers will still fall under the nonpublic
exemption.
Further, SEC Rules were recently amended to make public
solicitation of private sales much easier. They allow for unlimited
sales to wealthy investors, even if nonqualifying investors were
163
recipients of public offers. In fact, this amendment may potentially
159. Portfolio owners would not be left without a remedy. They could sue sellers of the
products that enable end users to infringe. See 35 U.S.C. §271(c) (2006) (defining contributory
liability to include providing components of infringing product). One concern with mass
demand letters is that they bypass the lowest cost defendant in the chain: the intermediate
enabler.
160. See Lewis v. Fresne, 252 F.3d 352, 358 (5th Cir. 2001) (“Two of the criteria for
determining if a transaction is public are the size of the offering and the number of offerees.”).
161. ESI Montgomery Cnty., Inc. v. Montenay Int’l Corp., 899 F. Supp. 1061, 1065
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (“Whether an offering is public within the meaning of the 1933 act depends on
‘(1) the number of offerees; (2) the sophistication of the offerees, including their access to the
type of information that would be contained in a registration statement; and (3) the manner of
the offering.’” (quoting United States v. Arutunoff, 1 F.3d 1112, 1118 (10th Cir. 1993))).
162. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, 1 TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 4.25
(6th ed. 2009) (“The safe harbor protection, thus, is no longer dependent upon the issuer being
able to prove that each offeree was qualified. On the other hand, if the issuer cannot show that it
took adequate precautions against the solicitation of nonqualified offerees, it may lose the
section 4(2) exemption because of the inability to show that a general solicitation did not take
place.” (footnotes omitted)).
163. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2013); Benjamin G. Lombard, United States: SEC Eliminates
Prohibition Against General Solicitation in Rule 506 Offerings and Adopts Rule Disqualifying
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eliminate the need for registration of initial public offerings before
164
public offers are made.
Consider, for example, Kodak’s recent bankruptcy auction of its
165
patent portfolio. The offer came from the court; as such, it was
widely reported and surely a public offer designed to obtain the
largest bid possible. In reality, however, very few companies were
going to pay the multibillion-dollar price that Kodak expected to
166
receive for its patents. In this sense, the offer was not really public.
It was designed to only attract those buyers that would otherwise be
exempt. Thus, even public announcements of portfolio sales might
not really be public offerings, and thus the concerns of the 1933 Act
do not really apply to such transactions. Indeed, under the new rules,
they would be exempt without question if the buyers qualified.
As discussed in the next sections, most parties will also fall into
safe harbors that allow for sales even to nonwealthy licensees and
purchasers.
b. Underwriters and Dealers. There are fewer restrictions for
167
securities transactions on those who did not issue the security. In
168
other words, those who buy stock may usually resell it, provided

Bad Actors from Rule 506 Offerings, MONDAQ, http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/252122/
Securities/SEC+Eliminates+Prohibition+Against+General+Solicitation+In+Rule+506+Offering
s+And+Adopts+Rule+Disqualifying+Bad+Actors+From+Rule+506+Offerings (last visited
Aug. 19, 2013).
164. Christine Hurt, More on General Solicitation: The Death of the IPO?, THE
CONGLOMERATE (July 16, 2013), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2013/07/more-on-generalsolicitation-the-death-of-the-ipo.html (“Company B can purchase billboards, taxi signs,
sandwich boards, Facebook ads, or even send an email to every person on earth. The catch is
that it can accept offers to buy only from accredited investors.”).
165. David McLaughlin, Apple, Google Deal for Kodak Patents Approved by Judge,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 11, 2013, 1:09 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-11/applegoogle-deal-for-kodak-patents-approved-by-judge.html. Put aside for one moment that the
bankruptcy court sanctioned the sale, which might change the way that exemptions are viewed.
166. See Debtors’ Motion For Orders (I) (A) Conditionally Authorizing the Sale of Patent
Assets Free and Clear of Claims and Interests, (B) Establishing a Competitive Bidding Process
and (C) Approving the Notice Procedures and (II) Authorizing the Sale of Patent Assets Free
and Clear of Claims and Interests at 10–11, In re Eastman Kodak Company, 479 B.R. 280
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 12-10202 (ALG)), 2012 WL 3880042, at *22–23 (requiring as a
condition for bidding “preliminary proof of the financial capacity of such person or entity to
close the Sale, which may include current unaudited or verified financial statements of such
person or entity”).
167. See Securities Act of 1933 § 4(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(1) (2012) (excepting
“transactions by any person other than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer”).
168. Id.
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169

they are not affiliated with the issuer. Presumably, the original seller
of a portfolio—that is, the first to aggregate it—would be the “issuer”
with respect to a later buyer of the whole portfolio. Similarly, the
aggregator would be the issuer with respect to future licensees. Thus,
portfolio buyers and licensees could transfer their respective rights
while remaining exempt from registration.
However, there is an important limitation: underwriters and
170
dealers, like issuers, are not exempt. This means that intermediary
market makers cannot take the place of issuers to avoid registration
requirements. An underwriter includes “any person who has
purchased from an issuer with a view to, or offers or sells for an issuer
171
in connection with, the distribution of any security.” A dealer, in
turn, is “any person who engages either for all or part of his time,
directly or indirectly, as agent, broker, or principal, in the business of
offering, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing or trading in securities
172
issued by another person.”
For example, when Microsoft purchased a portfolio of patents
from AOL and then quickly resold half of the portfolio to
173
Facebook, Microsoft likely fit the definition of an underwriter. It
purchased the security with a view to distributing it to AOL, and as
an underwriter it would lose the exemption of § 4(a)(1) and the
174
exemption of § 4(a)(2) because it was not an issuer.
But underwriters may be even more common than suggested by
the large Microsoft transaction. For example, any entity that
purchases a portfolio intending to license it to other companies might
be considered an underwriter. Consider also Ocean Tomo, a company
that periodically conducts patent auctions and aids companies in
175
monetizing their patent portfolios. Under the broad definition of
dealer, Ocean Tomo’s activities render it a dealer and probably even
176
177
an underwriter. Even though a dealer is exempt much of the time,

169. SEC Rules 144 and 144A detail some exceptions to this rule. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.144,
144A (2013).
170. Securities Act of 1933 § 4(a)(1).
171. Id. § 2(a)(11).
172. Id. § 2(a)(12).
173. See Facebook Buys AOL Patents from Microsoft in $550m Deal, supra note 53.
174. See Securities Act of 1933 §§ 4(a)(1), (2).
175. About Ocean Tomo, OCEAN TOMO, http://www.oceantomo.com/about (last visited
June 30, 2013).
176. It would be an underwriter if it were considered to be selling on behalf of an issuer. See
SEC v. Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Ass’n, 120 F.2d 738, 741 (2d Cir. 1941) (holding that a
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to the extent that a dealer aids an issuer or another underwriter to
complete a transaction, it transforms into an underwriter and loses its
178
exemption.
Despite appearing to fail the test for a § 4(a)(1) exemption, most
underwriter and dealer transactions will still be exempt with respect
to patent portfolios. Courts and commentators have noted the
179
existence of a so-called Section 4(1½) exemption. This exemption
recognizes that underwriter transactions that would have been
exempt under § 4(a)(2) as nonpublic offerings should also be exempt
180
under § 4(a)(1). The language of the statute supports this policy
somewhat. Underwriters are those who buy intending to distribute;
distribution, in turn, is undefined in the statute, but has generally
181
been interpreted to mean a public offering.
Most intermediated transactions will likely fall under the Section
4(1½) exemption for the same reasons that most issuer transactions
will be exempt. Intermediated deals are not generally offered to the
public; they are offered privately, and fit exemption rules for size and
sophistication of purchasers, as discussed below. The new buyer
182
would be required to make exempt sales only as well. Practically,
this means that auction houses would have to be selective about
potential bidders to ensure that the transaction is exempt.

company that assisted with the solicitation of an investment is an underwriter). If it merely
assisted, then perhaps not. See In re Refco, Inc., Sec. Litig. No. 05 Civ. 9626(GEL), 2008 WL
3843343, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“While the definition of ‘underwriter’ is indeed broad and is to
be interpreted broadly, it must be read in relation to the underwriting function that the
definition is intended to capture.”).
177. Securities Act of 1933 § 4(a)(3).
178. Id. § 2(a)(11).
179. A Section 4(a)(1½) exemption just does not have the same panache following the
recent addition of an “(a)” subpart in what used to be §§ 4(1) and 4(2). See Jumpstart Our
Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 201, 126 Stat. 306, 313 (2012).
180. See Carl W. Schneider, Section 4(1-1/2)—Private Resales of Restricted or Control
Securities, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 501, 510 (1988) (“Thus, there would appear to be no reason to
preclude an intent (or at least reservation of the right) to make further private resales by the
initial Holder or his Purchaser, absent a pyramiding problem that results in a public offering
from a series of purportedly integrated private sales.”).
181. Id.
182. See SEC v. Cavanagh, 1 F. Supp. 2d 337, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (“Accordingly, the SEC
has noted approvingly of precautions such as placing a legend on the securities alerting the
buyer to the restricted character of the securities.”); Schneider, supra note 180, at 510 (“In short,
the general principles applicable to a Holder should apply to said Purchaser, with such
Purchaser being, in essence, a new ‘Holder’ in connection with his own later section 4(1-1/2)
sale.”).
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Finally, if one is inclined to dismiss portfolio sales as securities,
but accept portfolio licenses as securities, then underwriters will likely
disappear from consideration. In such a scenario, purchases of
portfolios would not be security transactions, so their subsequent
licensing would be considered issuer transactions with the current
portfolio owner as issuer. The result would be the same, of course; the
exemption would just change from § 4(a)(1) to § 4(a)(2).
c. Transaction Size and Investor Sophistication. The law provides
several safe harbors based on placements of small value or to special
183
investors—whether by an issuer or underwriter. For example, an
offering of less than $5,000,000 in the aggregate is exempt when made
to investors of sufficient wealth and sophistication, called “accredited
investors,” so long as the seller does not publicly advertise or solicit
184
buyers.
Among other accreditation triggers, the threshold most relevant
to this Article states that a company with $5,000,000 in assets is an
185
accredited investor. Most companies buying patent portfolios will
186
meet this rule, and many licensees will as well. Even if all do not,
SEC Rules allow sales to up to thirty-five unaccredited investors, so
187
long as the total aggregate offering price is under $5,000,000.
Further, so long as unaccredited buyers have “such knowledge and
experience in financial and business matters that they are capable of
evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment,” the
sale will be considered exempt under the Rule 506 safe harbor to
188
§ 4(a)(2), regardless of offering size.
Further, the SEC allows for sales under $1,000,000 in total to be
considered private, exempt transactions under the Rule 504 safe
189
harbor to § 3(b). So long as certain additional criteria are met, § 4
public offering considerations do not apply, and anyone is a potential
purchaser.

183. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933 § 3(b) (allowing regulations to exempt offerings less
than $5,000,000); 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.504–505 (2013) (providing safe harbors for smaller
transactions).
184. Securities Act of 1933 § 4(a)(5).
185. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(3).
186. Of course, blockbuster portfolio transactions will exceed the aggregate total.
187. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(e)(1)(iv) (excluding accredited investors); id. § 230.505(b)(2)(ii)
(limiting investors to thirty-five sales).
188. Id. § 230.506. This assumes, of course, that all other requirements are met.
189. See id. § 230.504.
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One benefit of the regulations is that sellers must give notice to
190
the SEC, which creates a public record of transactions. Further,
transactions relying on § 4(a)(2) are considered nonpublic, and would
require steps to be taken so that the buyer does not transfer the
191
securities except in a nonpublic transaction.
The small-value and accredited-investor exceptions would affect
regulation of mass demand letters sent to small companies. Small
end-users might not fall into an accredited exception that allows them
to license the portfolio at a high dollar amount. This would leave the
patent holder with five primary choices: (1) reduce the amount to fall
under the $5,000,000 aggregate exemption, which allows for sales to
192
thirty-five unaccredited investors; (2) reduce the amount to fall
under the $1,000,000 aggregate exemption, which allows sales to
193
unlimited unaccredited investors; (3) register the portfolio with the
SEC, (4) seek licenses from larger companies that enable end-user
194
infringement, or (5) sue end users for infringement.
Based on these options, the end result may be the same in many
cases. However, more thought than is currently given to the process
would be required before any transaction to ensure that the goals of
the securities laws are in fact met: large transactions with smaller
companies require more information disclosure.
d. Transaction Brokers. Even if they are involved in private or
small transactions that are exempt under the 1933 Act, those who
195
assist in portfolio transactions might still be regulated under the
196
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act). Brokers are
defined as “any person engaged in the business of effecting
197
transactions in securities for the account of others.” Brokers (and
198
dealers within the 1934 Act ) must register with the SEC; they must
190. Securities Act of 1933 § 4(a)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(5) (2012); 17 C.F.R. §239.500.
191. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(d).
192. Id. § 230.505.
193. Id. § 230.502(b).
194. Resolution of a bona fide patent dispute might be considered a private placement.
195. See, e.g., ICAP PATENT BROKERAGE, http://icappatentbrokerage.com (last visited
Aug. 20, 2013); OCEAN TOMO, http://www.oceantomo.com (last visited Aug. 20, 2013).
196. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)(1) (2012). Section
3(a)(12) of the 1934 Act defines exempted securities, but the only unregistered securities listed
are those that are primarily intrastate. See id. § 3(a)(12).
197. Id. § 3(a)(4)(A).
198. The 1934 Act definition of dealer is much narrower than the 1933 Act definition and
likely not applicable here. Compare id. § 3(a)(5)(A) (defining a dealer as “any person engaged
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also join a self-regulatory organization that helps ensure minimum
199
conduct and quality standards. This might even include employees
of issuers (that is, licensing agents employed by portfolio companies),
200
but the SEC provides several exemptions for employees.
Given that many people do this today for other securities
trading, the requirement is likely not too onerous, and should have at
least some benefits relating to regulation of market participants. For
example, brokers have an independent due-diligence requirement as
201
participants in exempt private transactions.
2. Fraud. Even if a security is exempt from public-sale disclosure
rules, securities law promotes information disclosure using rules that
are currently unavailable in portfolio transactions. A primary purpose
202
of the securities laws is to prevent fraud in the sale of securities. The
203
most well-known prohibition is Rule 10b-5,
which outlaws
manipulative and deceptive acts, such as untrue statements of
material fact and omissions of material facts that would negate other
204
misleading facts. This rule would benefit potential purchasers and
205
licensees. For example, it would make failure to disclose known
prior art a securities violation. It would also outlaw misstatements
about prior licenses and royalties obtained, and other statements
about the validity of patents in the portfolio. Some might argue that it

in the business of buying and selling securities . . . for [his] own account through a broker or
otherwise”), with Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(12), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(12) (defining a dealer as
“any person who engages . . . directly or indirectly, as agent, broker, or principal, in the business
of offering, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing or trading in securities issued by another
person”).
199. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 15(a)(1), (b)(8); see id. § 15A(b)(6) (requiring, for
example, that the “rules of the association are designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative
acts and practices”).
200. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a4-1 (2013).
201. FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., REGULATORY NOTICE 10-22, REGULATORY D
OFFERINGS: OBLIGATION OF BROKER-DEALERS TO CONDUCT REASONABLE
INVESTIGATIONS IN REGULATION D OFFERINGS 3 (2010), available at http://www.finra.org/web/
groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/p121304.pdf.
202. See, e.g., The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml (last visited Aug. 20, 2013) (stating that one
objective of the 1933 Act is to “prohibit deceit, misrepresentations, and other fraud in the sale
of securities”).
203. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
204. Id.
205. Section 11 of the 1933 Act would provide additional remedies for false statements in
registration statements for public offerings. See Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k
(2012).
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should include disclosure of the patents in the portfolio in the first
206
place.
These are all benefits that are not provided under current
regulatory schemes. They are not required under patent law, nor are
they the types of activities that are considered anticompetitive, so
long as the patentee does not believe the patent to be invalid.
Additionally, common-law fraud does not provide the same
207
remedies. It is less stringent than securities laws. Also, securities
fraud can travel with the patent, and common-law fraud cannot. In
other words, if the original inventor committed a fraud, then
downstream buyers could look to the inventor despite a lack of
208
privity.
Portfolio holders looking to sell or license their patents would
likely object to these rules. However, they might use the law to their
advantage; if licensees believe that they are seeing all of the
portfolio’s blemishes, they may be more willing to agree to enter
license agreements. Thus, fraud rules can aid in market transactions.
3. Insider Trading. Related to reporting and fraud is insider
trading, which is considered in some cases to also be a violation of
209
Rule 10b-5. If the seller (or licensor) of the patent has knowledge
about the patent that is otherwise not available to the public, then the

206. See Patterson, supra note 61, at 506–07 (“Barnes & Noble alleged that in their
negotiations Microsoft initially refused to disclose which patents it claimed were being infringed
unless Barnes & Noble agreed to a nondisclosure agreement. Then, when Microsoft filed a
complaint . . . some of the patents it alleged were infringed were ones that it had not previously
disclosed in the negotiations.” (footnotes omitted)).
207. Herman & Maclean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389 (1983) (“Indeed, an important
purpose of the federal securities statutes was to rectify perceived deficiencies in the available
common-law protections by establishing higher standards of conduct in the securities
industry.”); SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 194 (1963) (“[T]he
doctrines of fraud and deceit which developed around transactions involving land and other
tangible items of wealth are ill-suited to the sale of such intangibles as advice and securities,
and . . . , accordingly, the doctrines must be adapted to the merchandise in issue.”); see also
Weston Instruments, Inc. v. Systron-Donner Corp., No. C-74-1099, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15987, at *1, *6–7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 1978) (refusing to apply securities laws to patent-related
fraud).
208. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 745 (1975) (“In today’s
universe of transactions governed by the 1934 Act, privity of dealing or even personal contact
between potential defendant and potential plaintiff is the exception and not the rule.”); Cochran
v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239, 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (reasoning that privity of contract was
not required for a securities-fraud violation). Antitrust laws would be unlikely to reach an
earlier wrongdoer as well.
209. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226–30 (1980).
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seller (or licensor) would violate the law by transacting without
210
disclosing that information. Such information might be about early
sales of the invention, which would invalidate the patent, for
211
example. It might also include information about past licenses,
212
which would narrow the pool of potential future licensees.
However, this type of insider trading is only actionable if there is
213
some sort of fiduciary duty owed. In the traditional case, employees
owe a duty to investors, and thus may not trade on insider
214
information. Portfolio buyers and licensees are not usually investors
in the seller’s company. Thus, a general fiduciary duty may not apply,
and when a license is negotiated at arm’s length, withholding of
information may not be actionable as insider trading. Then again,
buyers and licensees would be investors in the portfolios. As a result,
insider-trading rules may well apply.
B. Market Making
Treating patent portfolios as securities might aid the formation
of markets by encouraging market clearinghouses for previously
secret transactions, thus further encouraging the use of objective
criteria to price such portfolios.
1. Exchanges. If a market were formed to trade portfolio
securities, it would have to register as an exchange under the 1934
215
Act. Such marketplaces are unlikely to form, however; despite the

210. See Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35
STAN. L. REV. 857, 884 (1983) (“[S]ection 10(b) of the Security Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule
10b-5 . . . require corporate insiders and tippees either to disclose material inside information or
to refrain from trading.”).
211. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006), amended by Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No.
112-29, § 3(b)(1), 125 Stat. 284, 285 (2011).
212. Roy Strom, Wi-Fi Case Sheds Light on Patent Trolls, CHICAGO LAWYER (Apr. 1,
2013), http://chicagolawyermagazine.com/Archives/2013/04/Innovation-Patent-Trolls.aspx (“For
one, [Cisco’s counsel] said most of the patents that Innovatio is asserting were already licensed
by Broadcom to a host of other companies. Because he believes they were previously licensed,
Innovatio cannot try to collect that fee again, he said.”)
213. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230.
214. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(a) (2013) (defining manipulative and deceptive acts to
include “the purchase or sale of a security of any issuer, on the basis of material nonpublic
information about that security or issuer, in breach of a duty of trust or confidence that is owed
directly, indirectly, or derivatively, to the issuer of that security or the shareholders of that
issuer”).
215. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(1) (2012) (providing
that a key aspect of an “exchange” is that it brings buyers and sellers together in one
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goal of improved transactions, the type of marketplace envisioned by
the securities laws is unlikely given that the underlying transactions
216
must necessarily relate to some invented technology. To the extent
intermediaries aid transactions, they would likely do so as part of an
217
over-the-counter market. Even if such exchanges were formed, they
218
might be eligible for an exemption due to low volume.
This is not to say that there can never be a type of portfolio
exchange. At least one company is already attempting to create a type
of exchange. Intellectual Property Exchange International (IPXI) was
219
established to create transparent bidding on patent portfolios.
Every portfolio is vetted for validity, and similar patents are grouped
together for licensing. Forty-one companies—including product
companies, universities, and research labs—have provided patents for
220
licensing via the clearinghouse. Licensees may bid openly on the
221
portfolio, purchasing as many “units” of use as they may need.
These units can also be sold on a secondary market IPXI maintains. If
patents in the portfolio are invalidated or upheld in litigation or
patent reexamination, then the market price may adjust to reflect
such facts. Because the license is for a fixed and exhaustible number
of units, the IPXI licenses are more like commodities than
222
securities.
2. Dark Pools and Clearinghouses. Without exchanges, patent
portfolio trading is another form of “dark pool.” A dark pool is a
securities trade that is not viewed by the market; though pricing may

marketplace); id. § 5 (providing that it is illegal to operate an exchange without registration or
an exemption).
216. See, e.g., Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. SEC, 923 F.2d 1270, 1272–73 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding
that a computerized system was not an “exchange”).
217. See Therese H. Maynard, What is an “Exchange?”—Proprietary Electronic Securities
Trading Systems and the Statutory Definition of an Exchange, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 833, 902
(1992) (“[B]uying and selling interests meet on the exchange floor, in contrast to the [over-thecounter] market where buy and sell offers ‘come together only through dealers who interpose
themselves between the parties . . . .’” (quoting Bd. of Trade of Chi., 923 F.2d at 1274 (Flaum, J.,
dissenting))).
218. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.6a-1 (providing guidelines for filing an application for an
“exemption from . . . registration based on limited volume”).
219. IPX Int’l, Presentation 2 (Nov. 14, 2012) (pitch book on file with the Duke Law
Journal).
220. Id. at 5.
221. Id. at 13.
222. See Ian McClure, The Value of IP as a Commodity, INTELL. ASSET MGMT. MAG.,
May/June 2011, at 29, 31 (2011) (describing consumable licenses).
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be determined by market transactions, the dark transaction is hidden
223
from view. There are rational reasons why parties might want to
hide transactions from the market, most notably that they do not
224
want others to see their activity and drive prices up. Scholars have
225
argued that the same activities are occurring in patent transactions.
If patent portfolios are treated as securities, then they might be
regulated like dark markets, with transactions handled by a
226
clearinghouse similar to those of the Dodd-Frank Act. Such a
clearinghouse would have all the drawbacks of increased regulation
of financial transactions: additional costs, regulatory oversight, loss of
227
confidentiality, and other issues. It might, however, provide an
important benefit: easing the creation of a patent market, in which
patent portfolios are purchased and licensed with greater certainty
228
and reduced transactions costs.
However, limitations on patent enforcement may create a
potential barrier to market trading of patent portfolios. Patent law
229
disallows patent licensing for invalid and/or noninfringed patents.

223. Peter Kratz & Torsten Schoneborn, Optimal Liquidation in Dark Pools 1 (Apr. 13,
2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=1344583##.
224. Robert Hatch, Reforming the Murky Depths of Wall Street: Putting the Spotlight on the
Security and Exchange Commission’s Regulatory Proposal Concerning Dark Pools of Liquidity,
78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1032, 1034–35 (2010).
225. See Ewing & Feldman, supra note 67 (arguing that IV has purchased and licensed
patents using more than twelve hundred shell companies).
226. See Eduard H. Cadmus, Note, An Altered Derivatives Marketplace: Clearing Swaps
Under Dodd-Frank, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 189, 213 (2012) (describing the
requirement that swap transactions be cleared through an appropriate organization).
227. Interestingly, however, because portfolios themselves would be securities, they would
not be considered “asset-backed” securities under 1933 Act registration requirements, and thus
would avoid some more stringent reporting requirements. It is unclear whether a patent
portfolio would meet either definition, but it would more likely meet the broader 1934 Act
definition. Compare 17 C.F.R. § 229.1101(c) (2013) (defining “asset-backed securities” for
Regulation AB registration), with Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(79), 15 U.S.C. §78c
(2012) (defining “asset-backed securities” for the Dodd-Frank Act).
228. See Mark J. Roe, Clearinghouse Overconfidence, 101 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming
2013) (manuscript at 13), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2224305 (“In such informationally-opaque markets, spreads widen between the occasional
trader’s buying price and another occasional trader’s selling price, with wide spreads profiting
experienced, informed traders. . . . Because a clearinghouse with public pricing gives outsiders
the same information as the regular traders, spreads narrow. Trading becomes less expensive.”).
229. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 135 (1969)
(disallowing enforcement of patents on noninfringing products); Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S.
29, 32–33 (1964) (“[A] patentee’s use of a royalty agreement that projects beyond the expiration
date of the patent is unlawful per se.”).
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As such, licensees may argue that they need not pay the “market”
230
price because they only infringe some of the patents in the portfolio.
231
Technically, this is true with single-patent licenses. However, this
bar may be overcome by framing portfolio licenses as right-to-use
licenses. Right-to-use terms would state that the fair market price
includes not only payment for infringing products, but also the right
to create new infringing products in the future, using patented
232
inventions that are not currently infringed.
How courts treat such terms will be critically important to
portfolio licensing and, by extension, market formation. Licenses
granting rights to only one or two patents have little or no value if the
underlying patents are invalidated. Thus, right-to-use clauses will not
be terribly helpful.
For large portfolios, however, even if many patents expire or are
invalidated, the portfolio remains active. Portfolio owners would
argue that such bundling is not a sham because the licensee obtains
233
value for the remaining patents. Some might argue that the licensing

230. See, e.g., Patterson, supra note 61, at 506–07.
231. See Zila, Inc. v. Tinnell, 502 F.3d 1014, 1021 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[A] contract that provides
for royalties either when a patent expires or when it fails to issue cannot be upheld unless it
provides a discount from the alternative, patent-protected rate.”); Meehan v. PPG Indus., Inc.,
802 F.2d 881, 885–86 (7th Cir. 1986) (“Even when an inventor has not yet applied for a patent,
the right to apply for and obtain those protections is valuable.”); Boggild v. Kenner Prods., 776
F.2d 1315, 1319–20 (6th Cir. 1985) (explaining that a license must distinguish between patent
and nonpatent royalties); Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 701 F.2d 1365, 1371–72 (11th Cir. 1983)
(noting that Brulotte applies to hybrid agreements); Span-Deck, Inc. v. Fab-Con, Inc., 677 F.2d
1237, 1247 (8th Cir. 1982) (noting that a hybrid license must differentiate between patent and
nonpatent consideration); Zenith Radio Corp., 395 U.S. at 139–40; cf. Aronson v. Quick Point
Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 261–62 (1979) (holding that a royalty that decreases when a patent
does not issue is enforceable); Am. Securit Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 268 F.2d 769, 777
(3d Cir. 1959) (holding that package patent licensing is misuse if it is a sham).
232. See Hull v. Brunswick Corp., 704 F.2d 1195, 1202–03 (10th Cir. 1983) (holding that the
continuation of royalties under one patent after the expiration of a second patent is
enforceable); cf. Zila, Inc., 502 F.3d at 1021–22 (“This understanding, however, may well
overread both Brulotte and Aronson, by glossing over the unique and onerous contractual
restrictions at issue in Brulotte and relying on a sentence in Aronson that is really only dicta. . . .
In short, were we writing on a clean slate, we might be inclined to read the dicta in Aronson as
nonbinding in light of what appears on its face to be a very limited holding in Brulotte. By doing
so, we would largely avoid attributing to the Supreme Court in Brulotte and Aronson the lack of
economic logic laid at its feet . . . .”).
233. See U.S. Philips Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 424 F.3d 1179, 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(“[G]rouping licenses in a package allows the parties to price the package based on their
estimate of what it is worth to practice a particular technology, which is typically much easier to
calculate than determining the marginal benefit provided by a license to each individual
patent.”).

RISCH IN PRINTER (FN CORRECTION) (DO NOT DELETE)

136

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

9/18/2013 8:26 AM

[Vol. 63:89
234

value for noninfringed right-to-use patents must be minimal, but
this is a question of pricing, as discussed below. Concerns about
portfolio licensing are not unlike similar concerns about copyright
package licensing. Opponents considered blanket music licenses from
the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers
(ASCAP) to be a form of price fixing, but the Supreme Court
235
disagreed. Today, such licenses are considered not only efficient,
236
but also an indispensable way to avoid ongoing conflict.
The rule that one may not license an invalid or noninfringed
patent affects portfolio licensing in a few ways. First, small portfolios
might need to be supplemented as patents are invalidated or expire to
ensure that the number of patents in the license remains reasonable.
This creates an incentive for portfolio owners to take up-front fees
and to avoid supplementing, leading to a difficult choice between
license scope and future portfolio growth. Second, portfolios must
nominally relate to similar technology. As the type of technology
diversifies away from one technology, the argument that a license is
being made for a right-to-use becomes less credible. The problem is
that a technology focus reduces the investment diversification of the
portfolio as well. Thus, the investment becomes more subject to
systemic risk relating to the technology. As discussed above, the goal
of the portfolio owner is to diversify technology as much as possible
while still attracting licensees. A legal rule that requires too much
focus hinders that diversification. As a result, the rule creates a
difficult choice between diversification and size.
This particular enforcement problem only affects licensing
markets. Patent buyers may purchase as many diverse patents as they
wish, and place them into different licensing pools as they see fit.

234. See Patterson, supra note 61, at 510–11 (“A patentee . . . is not justified in insisting
upon continued licensing of an invalid or non-infringed patent.”).
235. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1979) (holding
that ASCAP’s blanket license was not per se illegal and remanding the case to determine
whether the license was illegal under rule-of-reason analysis).
236. See id. at 20–21 (“Most users want unplanned, rapid, and indemnified access to any and
all of the repertory of compositions, and the owners want a reliable method of collecting for the
use of their copyrights. Individual sales transactions in this industry are quite expensive, as
would be individual monitoring and enforcement, especially in light of the resources of single
composers. . . . A middleman with a blanket license was an obvious necessity if the thousands of
individual negotiations, a virtual impossibility, were to be avoided.”). But see Michael A.
Einhorn, Intellectual Property and Antitrust: Music Performing Rights in Broadcasting, 24
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 349, 350–51 (2001) (stating that concerns about anticompetitive
licenses continue).
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3. Security Pricing. If portfolios are treated as securities, then
more efficient portfolio pricing may be the most important
237
requirement to reducing transactions costs and forming a market.
As portfolios grow, then lowering pricing costs may be preferable to
238
completely accurate pricing. The benefits of efficient portfoliopricing techniques will apply even if portfolios are not securities, but
treating portfolios as securities would hasten implementation.
Of course, securities laws are not necessary for these pricing
methods, but they can help. Information disclosure rules can aid in
providing information about portfolio composition. Clearinghouses
can provide transparency about past pricing. And, perhaps most
importantly, a culture of trading can encourage the use of better
pricing techniques.
In the traditional economic analysis, efficient market prices are
set by the intersection of those willing to pay a certain price and those
willing to sell at a certain price. This is what we might call the fair or
market-clearing price. Stocks are usually considered to be priced this
way, even if the participants do not have complete information.
239
Indeed, patents are often valued based on their selling prices.
Thus, when all the rights to a patent portfolio are sold, the
pricing should approach what we might think of as market-clearing
prices. Buyers and sellers will have independent, arm’s-length beliefs
about the value of the portfolio. As such, the set price can be
considered fair, even if the price does not reflect the “true” value of

237. See Kramer, supra note 10, at 466 (“Endeavoring to evaluate dozens or potentially
hundreds of patents that might be relevant in a significant business decision is impractical and
generally fails to consider the context and interactions of the market. Thus, an efficient yet
accurate means of patent valuation is needed to facilitate the inquiry.” (footnote omitted));
Meeks & Eldering, supra note 6, at 195–96 (“No agreed-upon patent valuation technique
current exists. Consequently . . . the market remains largely inefficient, illiquid, and opaque.”);
cf. Gene Quinn, Chief Judge Rader: “We Need To Tolerate a Little Injustice,” IPWATCHDOG
(Oct. 4, 2011, 11:30 AM), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2011/10/04/chief-judge-rader-we-need-totolerate-a-little-injustice/id=19544 (debating the merits of case-by-case damages analysis versus
efficient but potentially unjust rules of thumb).
238. See Meeks & Eldering, supra note 6, at 205–06 (“[I]n the mergers and acquisitions
context involving hundreds, if not thousands, of patents and a time constraint of two to three
weeks to conduct due diligence, thorough claim analysis proves virtually impossible. . . . The
inability to quickly and accurately value patents undoubtedly creates a significant challenge for
technology-focused firms and those responsible for their patent portfolio management. One
practitioner stated that he is fairly confident that no one has solved this problem yet, and he
believes that companies essentially trade accuracy for speed in M&A deals involving a relatively
large number of patents.”).
239. 34 AM. JUR. 2D Federal Taxation § 42,044 (2013).
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the asset. This is little different from how stocks are priced; stocks
might be purchased for more than the company is “worth” based on
its expected revenue streams. This is not a bug in the system, but a
feature. Sometimes, people pay more than they should in a market
transaction, and those who overpay might lose money when the price
falls.
A big difference, of course, is that licensees must purchase or
face litigation. However, if accurate pricing methodologies are
developed, then the tradeoff between litigation and a market-clearing
price should be achievable. Another big difference is that portfolios
must be priced as a whole; attempts to separately debate and price
every patent in the portfolio will increase transaction costs and likely
240
lead to failed transactions.
Unfortunately, full information and pricing methodologies are
241
often unavailable, which creates a real problem in the market.
Furthermore, reforms to the litigation system to bring damages in line
with the actual value of patents and to reduce the cost of litigation
would be helpful. Litigation reforms are beyond the scope of this
Article. The goal here, therefore, is to explore methods for relatively
accurate pricing with the information available to market
participants, regardless of what that information might be. This may
be more possible than many think. After all, much more information
is available about privately traded patents—for those willing to do the
242
research—than about many private companies selling stock.
240. See Patterson, supra note 61, at 508–09 (“[G]rouping licenses in a package allows the
parties to price the package based on their estimate of what it is worth to practice a particular
technology, which is typically much easier to calculate than determining the marginal benefit
provided by a license to each individual patent.” (quoting U.S. Philips Corp. v. Int’l Trade
Comm’n, 424 F.3d 1179, 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2005))).
241. See Lemley & Myhrvold, supra note 3, at 257 (“Patents . . . exist in just such a blind
market. Want to know if you are getting a good deal on a patent license or technology
acquisition? Too bad. Even if that patent or ones like it have been licensed dozens of times
before, the terms of those licenses, including the price itself, will almost invariably be
confidential.”); Meeks & Eldering, supra note 6, at 205 (“Virtually all [in-house counsel]
interviewees lamented the fact that no coherent valuation technique exists.”); Nikolic, supra
note 3, at 409 (“The absence of a regulated market creates a lack of liquidity, making
investments less attractive to investors and providing less transparency for investors.”);
Patterson, supra note 61, at 508–09 (“[I]f a patentee insists on licensing its portfolio as a whole,
without identifying which particular patents are infringed or what the royalty for licensing them
individually would be, a licensee is unable to make the determinations that are necessary for
sensible decision making in the licensing process.”).
242. See John E. Dubiansky, An Analysis for the Valuation of Venture Capital-Funded
Startup Firm Patents, 12 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 170, 175 (2006) (“In fact, there is much more
information available on patent transactions than for many other aspects of the venture capital
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Further, if portfolios are sold in public offerings, then information
about them would be required in a registration statement as is
required with publicly traded stock.
a. Pricing Based on Past Licensing. The best way to price a
243
portfolio is to use past licenses of the same patent or portfolio.
Absent that, licenses of comparable patents and portfolios might be
used. However, using actual negotiated prices can be problematic.
244
Such data is difficult to find because it is kept secret. Further, when
245
licenses are made public, they often omit information. As patents
become traded like commodities more often, the secrecy concern may
diminish. That is because brokers who have experience in multiple
licensing transactions can bring experience to bear on later
246
negotiations.
Even armed with data, however, licenses of comparable patents
247
may not be helpful. Use of comparable licenses assumes that similar
patents (or even licenses of the same patent) can be treated similarly.
248
This may not always be true. For example, the products associated
with the patents may be priced differently, making royalties
incomparable.
Further, because portfolios are licensed to potential infringers,
the portfolio owner has significantly more leverage to use against the
licensee; the portfolio owner can sue for damages or an injunction.
industry.”); Kelley, supra note 1, at 131–32 (describing the ways that patents provide
information).
243. See Meeks & Eldering, supra note 6, at 203.
244. Kramer, supra note 10, at 469; Lemley & Myhrvold, supra note 3, at 257.
245. Jonathan A. Barney, A Study of Patent Mortality Rates: Using Statistical Survival
Analysis To Rate and Value Patent Assets, 30 AIPLA Q.J. 317, 323 (2002).
246. See Kelley, supra note 1, at 121 (asserting that 75 percent of transactions are through
brokers); Meeks & Eldering, supra note 6, at 205 (“According to another practitioner, as
brokers have done an increasing number of deals, some increasingly rely on their databases to
set proposed prices for patents based on (1) the technology area and (2) the mean value of
patent prices in that technology area.”).
247. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 61, at 2022 (arguing that royalties in publicly
disclosed licenses are larger than royalties in general because only “material” licenses are
reported under SEC rules), Meeks & Eldering, supra note 6, at 202 (explaining that “identifying
values of comparable patents sold or licensed in the market place” is not that helpful for valuing
patents because of the “confidentiality surrounding the majority of patent transactions”).
248. See Kelley, supra note 1, at 130 (“Mandatory disclosure, however, is unlikely to be
effective in reducing transaction costs in this marketplace, because it rests on the questionable
premise that other patent transactions about which information is disclosed are readily
‘comparable’ and therefore will reliably determine an appropriate value in a practitioner’s
current transaction.”).
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This leverage increases as the size of the portfolio grows. As such,
negotiated payments may overstate portfolio value.
This overstatement is mitigated by a couple of countervailing
factors. First, potential licensees do not blindly accept arrangements.
Instead, portfolio owners usually present the patents in the portfolio
that they think the potential licensee most likely infringes. Indeed, a
good portfolio will often have patents related to different
technologies, and the licensees may not want or need all of those
250
patents. Large corporations often do the same thing when crosslicensing patent portfolios and the parties are negotiating a “balance
payment,” which is the amount one party pays to the other so that
251
each side contributes equal value. Similarly, standards-setting
organizations require members to license the portfolio of patents
252
contributed by that member.
Second, potential licensees can always refuse to pay for a license
if the price is too high. Portfolio owners cannot realistically sue on
more than a few patents at a time, and they cannot sue more than one
253
defendant at a time in a single action. Additionally, with every
litigated challenge, there is a risk that a patent will be invalidated,
which may reduce the portfolio value, especially given the nonjoinder
rules that give each defendant a defense in front of a different court.
Thus, portfolio owners have some incentive to charge less than they
otherwise might attempt. Of course, large portfolios make it more
difficult to challenge any particular patent, because there are several
254
more to follow even if any given patent is invalidated.

249. Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 4, at 35–36; Patterson, supra note 61, at 504.
250. See Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 4, at 41 (“One important insight into the
dual-form benefits of patent portfolios (scale and diversity) is that substantial tension exists
between these two goals. That is, as noted above, effective patent portfolios are both sizable—
covering an expanse of closely-related subject matter—and diverse—composed of distinct
individual patents, thus diminishing the importance of any specific patentable subject matter.
Yet maximizing one dimension will degrade the other.”).
251. See, e.g., Nilay Patel, Intel Agrees To Pay NVIDIA $1.5b in Patent License Fees, Signs
Cross-license, ENGADGET (Jan. 10, 2011, 5:07 PM), http://www.engadget.com/2011/01/10/intelagrees-to-pay-nvidia-1-5b-in-patent-license-fees-signs-c.
252. Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard
Setting, in 1 INNOVATION, POL’Y, & ECON. 119, 128 (Adam B. Jaffe, Josh Lerner & Scott Stern
eds., 2001).
253. See 35 U.S.C. § 299 (Supp. V 2011) (limiting joinder of defendants).
254. See Steven C. Carlson, Patent Pools and the Antitrust Dilemma, 16 YALE J. ON REG.
359, 386–87 (1999) (arguing that patent portfolios can shield weak patents); Jean O. Lanjouw &
Mark Schankerman, Protecting Intellectual Property Rights: Are Small Firms Handicapped? 47
J.L. & ECON. 45, 45 (2004) (finding that firms with large portfolios litigate less than firms with
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In any event, data is likely not available to efficiently price
portfolios based on existing pricing.
b. Royalty- and Cost-Stream Pricing. Another potential pricing
strategy stems from traditional stock pricing. Share pricing is typically
theorized as the net present value of all the expected revenues to the
255
company. Indeed, some have suggested a similar method to value
256
patents. For patents, buyers would consider the stream of royalties
257
they would pay or the stream of costs to defend infringement suits.
Though more data would be available for this pricing method, it
also suffers from difficulties. The stream of costs would be based in
large part on threats by the patent holder rather than the patent’s
value. Additionally, such costs would be subject to the same
asymmetric leverage that biases existing licenses. Even without
leverage, the price will be different based on the potential product
configurations of licensees. As a result, as portfolios become larger
and more complex, defining a single valuation might be more
258
difficult.

smaller portfolios); Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 16, at 82 (“If the holder of a large patent
portfolio asserts its patents against another company and claims that the other company is
infringing dozens or even hundreds of its patents, the target company faces a very complex and
costly undertaking if it chooses to fight all of those patent infringement claims in court, knowing
that it has to win all or nearly all of the individual patent cases to avoid [payment] . . . .”);
Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 4, at 66 (“Yet, in many cases, the invalidation of one of
the patents in a portfolio might not have a dramatic effect on the overall value.”); Patterson,
supra note 61, at 504 (discussing the competitive advantage of large portfolios due to the
increased cost and difficulty of assessing infringement).
255. See Stephen P. Baginski & James M. Wahlen, Residual Income Risk, Intrinsic Values,
and Share Prices, 78 ACCT. REV. 327, 328 (2003); cf. Meeks & Eldering, supra note 6, at 232–33
(suggesting a method for calculating net present value discount rate for patents).
256. See Robert S. Bramson, Valuing Patents, Technologies and Portfolios: Rules of Thumb,
in HANDLING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES IN BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 2001, available at
635 PLI/PAT 465, 469–70 (1999) (valuing patents based on present value of royalties less
litagation expenses); Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 639–41 (2002)
(presenting a model of patent value that includes expected stream of rents, including signaling
information about the company obtaining a patent); Meeks & Eldering, supra note 6, at 202;
Nikolic, supra note 3, at 404 (suggesting that only patents with defined cash flow can be
securitized).
257. Bramson, supra note 256, at 469–70; see also GORDON V. SMITH & RUSSELL L. PARR,
VALUATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTANGIBLE ASSETS 222–24 (3d ed. 2000)
(describing the relief from royalty approach to valuation).
258. See Kramer, supra note 10, at 464 (“Accurate assessment can be cumbersome in more
complex transactions, such as significant cross licensing negotiations. Such deals can involve
multiple patents of various magnitudes, perhaps covering disparate technologies, and sometimes
uncertain commercial applications.”).
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Nonetheless, pricing based on potential future royalties is
alluring because it is based on real costs and benefits. Use of this
method should be based in part on realistic expectations of damages
259
if there were litigation. This implies that efficient pricing of
securities is most likely to be achieved when there is a better
definition of expected damages in court. If the parties cannot agree
on a reasonable damages calculation, then they will have difficulty
agreeing on a likely stream of such damages in case of litigation. If the
parties can agree, they can make adjustments for the likelihood that
260
at least one patent will be valid and infringed, which might, in turn,
be based on the litigation history of patents in the portfolio or other
261
objective indicia, discussed below. Further, use of the method
should include financially sound calculations of discount rates to
adjust expected future royalties for risk that the patent’s value will
262
decrease over time.
263
Related is the option-pricing method. In this method, a patent
license represents the ability to exploit the patent in the future, just as
a stock option represents the ability to purchase a share of stock in
264
the future. The dominant method for pricing options, the Black265
Scholes formula, considers a stock’s price volatility. Option pricing
is difficult for individual patents because the volatility of a patent’s
266
price is usually unknown. Even so, the model for pricing options
259. See Meeks & Eldering, supra note 6, at 222 (suggesting that potential patent damages
are the touchstone for calculating future royalty payments).
260. Id. at 232.
261. Michael J. Mazzeo, Jonathan Hillel & Samantha Zyontz, Predicting the
“Unpredictable”: An Empirical Analysis of U.S. Patent Infringement Awards 3 (Oct. 21, 2012)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2164787 (finding that objective patent criteria predict 75 percent of infringement damages
awards).
262. See, e.g., Meeks & Eldering, supra note 6, at 223–31 (suggesting a method for
calculating market volatility for determination of discount rate under the capital asset pricing
model).
263. See generally ROBERT PITKETHLY, THE VALUATION OF PATENTS: A REVIEW OF
PATENT VALUATION METHODS WITH CONSIDERATIONS OF OPTION BASED METHODS AND
THE POTENTIAL FOR FURTHER RESEARCH (1997); Nicholas Bloom & John Van Reenen,
Patents, Real Options, and Firm Performance, 112 ECON. J. C97 (2002).
264. Denton & Heald, supra note 9, at 1195.
265. Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81 J.
POL. ECON. 637, 638–39 (1973); Denton & Heald, supra note 9, at 1199; Robert C. Merton,
Theory of Rational Option Pricing, 4 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 141, 148 (1973).
266. Meeks & Eldering, supra note 6, at 202. Additionally, the formula relies on some
assumptions about stock pricing—such as a normal distribution—that may not hold true for
patent pricing. See Denton & Heald, supra note 9, at 1203–04 (discussing difficulties of option
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might give some clues about how to think about pricing an entire
267
portfolio based on objective and observable indicators of value.
Some have proposed a patent valuation based on profits
268
associated with manufacturing a product. This method, though
reasonable, is unlikely to be applicable in the patent-securities setting
for all but the most expansive of patents. Because most patents cover
incremental innovation, it is rare that a patent (or even a portfolio)
269
will be associated with specific profits for a unique product. Of
course, pharmaceutical or pioneering mechanical patents may grant
such rights, in which case the value of profits from the product might
far exceed the costs of avoiding royalties or litigation costs.
c. Objective Indicator Pricing. Thus, it would be helpful to find a
way to value a patent portfolio for licensing or for sale when there is
no recent sale of similar portfolios. Ideally, such valuation would be
270
based on objectively measurable criteria, which is contrary to how
271
pricing has traditionally worked. Such a model must also provide
272
reasonable estimates, rather than guesses.
pricing); cf. NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY
IMPROBABLE 279 (2d ed. 2007) (criticizing assumptions of the Black-Scholes pricing formula).
267. See, e.g., Ming-Cheng Wu & Chun-Yao Tseng, Valuation of Patent—A Real Options
Perspective, 13 APPLIED ECON. LETTERS 313, 316 (2006) (using citations as a proxy for patent
value to calculate option price).
268. See, e.g., SMITH & PARR, supra note 257, at 224–27.
269. See Dubiansky, supra note 242, at 174 (“For an investor in a startup firm, the Relief
from Royalty approach is more helpful because it best approximates the resale value of the
patent. This approach analogizes the patent asset to a piece of production equipment.”).
270. See Denton & Heald, supra note 9, at 1177 (“We conclude that an adequate patent
pricing metric must combine probabilistic methods familiar to experts in mathematical finance,
quantum mechanics, and statistical climatology, with the strategic assumptions familiar to game
theorists.”); Kelley, supra note 1, at 126 (“As such, the industry has developed multiple tools
and rating systems, both custom and off-the-shelf, to facilitate evaluations based on [objective]
factors.”); Kramer, supra note 10 (proposing econometric valuation of patents based on patent
characteristics); see also, e.g., John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley, Kimberly A. Moore & Derek
R. Trunkey, Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 437–38 (2004) (describing criteria used to
compare valuable patents with other patents); Maayan Filmar, An Ex Ante Method of Patent
Valuation: Transforming Patent Quality into Patent Value, 13 J. HIGH TECH. L. (forthcoming
2013) (manuscript at 45–52), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2252251 (describing several objective measures of patent valuation).
271. Landers, supra note 7, at 165 (“As a practical matter, under current patent valuation
principles, a patent’s worth is dependent on a constellation of factors. These include the
business context of the products that relate to the invention, the state of technological progress,
and anticipated commercialization opportunities.”); id. at 167 (“Moreover, it is questionable
whether patent valuation can be credibly performed without some reliance on the market as a
touchstone.”); see also Bramson, supra note 256, at 475 (setting $5 million as the minimum value
for any portfolio); Kelley, supra note 1, at 125 (describing claims charts as the most important
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It may seem strange to consider the value of the portfolio when
one cannot calculate the value of any individual patent in it.
However, because a portfolio tends to minimize the impact of any
273
one patent through the law of large numbers, statistical tools may
be better at calculating the value of a portfolio than previously
274
expected. For example, economists have been estimating the value
275
of all patents in a country or technology area for some time; the
same methodology might apply to large portfolios. Furthermore,
pricing a portfolio is likely cheaper and easier than examining every
276
patent in it.
Comparing observable information is unlikely to yield value
information for individual patents. Two patents may have identical
citations, but may have vastly different values based on technology
and other, less measurable aspects of the patent. Indeed, the most
detailed valuation studies at the individual level only rank patents in
277
value as compared with others. On the other hand, if a general

factor in valuation); Meeks & Eldering, supra note 6, at 197 (measuring patent value based on
“the scope of the patent’s claims . . . the products or services covered by the patent’s
claim . . . and the economic benefit associated with the product or service”); Scott D. Phillips,
Patent & High Technology Licensing: Evaluation of Patent Portfolios, in PATENT & HIGH
TECHNOLOGY LICENSING, available at 652 PLI/PAT 57, 67 (2001) (“What technical areas does
the portfolio address? How much in a given subject area is covered by patent claims? What
problems do the patents really solve? How important are the patents to others or to industry
standards? Who else is in the field, and how significant of an industry player are they? What
alternatives to licensing exist?”).
272. See, e.g., Richard A. Neifeld, A Macro-Economic Model Providing Patent Valuation
and Patent Based Company Financial Indicators, 83 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 211, 213
(2001) (purporting to assign value to every U.S. patent). Neifeld’s results seem disconnected
from reality, assigning a value of $1.6 million to a bathtub patent and $4.7 million to a clamp
patent. These calculations seem out of touch with the nearly universal finding that most patents
are not worth anything. See, e.g., Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 4, at 52.
273. See Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 4, at 6 (“Rational firms will therefore
typically seek to obtain a large quantity of related patents, rather than evaluating their
individual worth.”).
274. See Kramer, supra note 10, at 467 (“The efficiency of the analytical methodology makes
it particularly well suited to the management of patent portfolios.”).
275. See generally, e.g., Griliches et al., supra note 6; Mark Schankerman & Ariel Pakes,
Estimates of the Value of Patent Rights in European Countries During the Post-1950 Period, 96
ECON. J. 1052 (1986); Mark Schankerman, How Valuable is Patent Protection? Estimates by
Technology Field, 29 RAND J. OF ECON. 77 (1998).
276. See Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 4, at 64 (suggesting that portfolio licensing
will reduce transaction costs in part by obviating the need to examine and/or license individual
patents).
277. Allison et al., supra note 270, at 448–60; Kramer, supra note 10, at 481; Jean O.
Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, The Quality of Ideas: Measuring Innovation with Multiple
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model is developed that can separate valuable patents from
nonvaluable patents, then a large portfolio can be filtered into groups
278
of valuable and nonvaluable patents. Thus, ranking value may be
preferable to no information at all, but such ranking may not be
279
sufficient for market pricing of an individual patent.
i. Forward Citations. There are a few clues that imply a patent’s
potential worth as part of the portfolio. The first is the number of
times the patent is cited by other patents; this is often called forward
citations. In general, more valuable patents appear to be cited more
280
than other patents. Furthermore, they are cited by others much
281
further into the future than the average patent. This makes intuitive
sense; one would expect more important patents to be cited by
282
others. Thus, one study found that counting citations after five years
is sufficient to measure initial expectations about a patent’s quality,
but longer-term citations show unexpected increases in patent value
283
over time (a long tail).
One study even found (perhaps
counterintuitively) a U-shape distribution, with value peaking and
Indicators 11 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7345, 1999), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w7345.
278. Piotr Masiakowski & Sunny Wang, Integration of Software Tools in Patent Analysis, 35
WORLD PAT. INFO. 97 (2013) (describing tools for textual analysis of patent portfolios).
279. But see Barney, supra note 245, at 330–32. Barney uses maintenance renewal rates to
create a range of values for all patents. He then argues that patents ranked by quality can be
placed somewhere on that range to obtain a value. However, this method is based on some
fairly tenuous assumptions about the distribution of patent values.
280. Allison, et al., supra note 270, at 455; Kramer, supra note 10, at 475–76; Lanjouw &
Schankerman, supra note 277, at 10; see Cristina Odasso, Giuseppe Scellato & Elisa Ughetto,
Selling Patents at Auction: An Empirical Analysis of Patent Value 15 (July 10, 2013)
(unpublished manuscript) (finding that forward citations correlate with higher auction prices),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2291874. Such references should
be normalized by the age of the patent. Kramer, supra note 10, at 485.
281. Kramer, supra note 10, at 478; Adam Jaffe & Manuel Trajtenberg, International
Knowledge Flows: Evidence from Patent Citations 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 6507, 1999).
282. But see Meeks & Eldering, supra note 6, at 203–04 (arguing that backward citations
measure the quality of disclosure, but not the scope of claims). As discussed below, this concern
can be addressed by considering the interaction of citations and claims.
283. Lanjouw & Schankerman, supra note 277, at 14–15; see also Bronwyn Hall, Adam Jaffe
& Manuel Trajtenberg, Market Value and Patent Citations: A First Look, 36 RAND J. ECON. 16,
18–19 (2005) (finding that stock market values reflect future patent citations from that time and
thus reflect changes in patent valuation); Gregory P. Daines, Patent Citations and Licensing
Value 60 (June 2007) (unpublished MBA thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology),
available at http://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/39530/173993864.pdf?sequence=1
(confirming that forward citation counts contain information on the private licensing value of
patents).
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then receding as the number of citations increases. For purposes of
valuation, however, the distribution shape is irrelevant so long as it is
predictive of value in some sense.
One problem with using forward citations, however, is that they
are only telling in hindsight. Older patents will necessarily have had a
chance to accumulate whatever citations they might garner, whereas
newer patents are uncertain. This can have the dual effect of
increasing pricing uncertainty of new patents as well as skewing their
value lower. As noted above, this effect may diminish within the first
five years, though such estimates necessarily trim the so-called long
tail.
ii. Backward Citations. Another potential clue is the number of
other patents that the patent at issue cites. This is often called
references or backward citations. The results here are a bit murkier.
Intuitively one would expect that the more references a patent makes,
the more likely it is to be valid. On the other hand, patents are often
invalidated based on nonpatent prior art, such that patent references
are less indicative of value. Some studies have found the number of
285
references to be statistically representative of value, but other
286
measures in the same studies refute this finding. One study found
that the number of references was not statistically different between
287
valuable patents and the general population. Indeed, another study
found that, as compared with once-litigated patents, heavily litigated
patents are much less likely to win in court, despite having more
288
references. This undermines the use of backward citations for

284. David S. Abrams, Ufuk Akcigit & Jillian Popadak, Understanding the Link Between
Patent Value and Citations: Creative Destruction or Defensive Disruption? 1 (Apr. 8, 2013)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.kentlaw.iit.edu/Documents/Academic%20
Programs/Intellectual%20Property/PatCon3/abrams.pdf.
285. E.g. Allison et al., supra note 270, at 449, 453–55; see Lanjouw & Schankerman, supra
note 277, at 10 (finding that references were statistically significant for all types of patents, but
were better quality indicators for drug and chemical patents).
286. See Lanjouw & Schankerman, supra note 277, at 16 (finding that backward references
did not affect the probability that maintenance fees would be paid on the patent).
287. Kramer, supra note 10, at 477. Kramer finds that essential patents (for technology
standards) tend to cite newer prior art than does the average patent. Id. at 478. This cuts both
ways. It implies, as Kramer argues, that essential patents are timelier. But it may also imply that
such patents are more obvious.
288. See John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & Joshua Walker, Patent Quality and Settlement
Among Repeat Patent Litigants, 99 GEO. L.J. 677, 681, 686–87 (2011) (noting that most-litigated
patent plaintiffs won only 10.7 percent of suits as compared with 47.3 percent of once-litigated
patent plaintiffs).
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valuation. These criticisms of backward citations are unsurprising,
given evidence that patent examiners simply do not read references
289
cited by patent applicants.
iii. Originality and Generality. Two other citation measures that
290
Originality
may prove helpful are originality and generality.
291
measures the technological breadth of backward references. The
wider the breadth, the more likely the patent is considered new; the
narrower the breadth, the more likely the patent is incremental to one
292
specific field. Generality measures the technology distribution of
293
forward citations—patents citing the patent at issue. The broader
the distribution of technology that relies on the patent, the more
general and valuable the original patent might be. For example, the
294
forward citations for physicist William Shockley’s transistor patent
are quite general, spanning many different fields. Some studies have
found that more valuable patents have both more originality and
more generality as compared with the average patent, including the
295
average patent in the same technology field.
iv. Number of Patents. Whereas a simple count of patents should
not be enough to price a portfolio, ignoring the number of patents
would ignore economic reality. Quite simply, the larger the portfolio,
the more valuable it will be, even if the individual patents have
296
relatively low value. However, size must be combined with breadth
of technology and quality. If the portfolio is large, but spotty and

289. See Christopher A. Cotropia, Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Do Applicant Patent
Citations Matter?, 42 RES. POL’Y 844, 844 (2013) (“We find, to our surprise, that patent
examiners did not use applicant-submitted art in the rejections that narrowed claims before
these patents issued, relying almost exclusively on prior art they find themselves.”).
290. See Manuel Trajtenberg, Rebecca Henderson & Adam B. Jaffe, University Versus
Corporate Patents: A Window on the Basicness of Invention, in ADAM B. JAFFE & MANUEL
TRAJTENBERG, PATENTS, CITATIONS & INNOVATIONS: A WINDOW ON THE KNOWLEDGE
ECONOMY 60, 63 (2002) (defining generality and originality).
291. Id. at 63.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 60.
294. U.S. Patent No. 2,569,347 (filed June 26, 1948).
295. Kramer, supra note 10, at 479–80.
296. See, e.g., Alfonse Gambardella, Professor of Corporate Mgmt., Bocconi Univ.,
Presentation to the OECD Conference on Patent Practice & Innovation, The Value of Patent
Portfolios: Numbers vs Average Quality 20 (May 10, 2012), available at http://www.oecd.org/sti/
innovationinsciencetechnologyandindustry/workshop-patent-practice-and-innovationGambardella.pdf (showing the role of number of patents in portfolio value).
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weak, then it will not be as valuable as a focused and strong
297
portfolio. Similarly, if the portfolio is too narrow, then a large size
298
may not provide sufficient coverage. Thus, any pricing method
should include an objective measure of both size and breadth.
d. Patent Claims as Indicators. Some studies have found the
299
number of claims relevant to value. Counting claims has an
ambiguous connection to value. Although one study implies that
300
more claims are associated with expected quality, that same study
shows that the number of claims is unrelated to the probability that
301
maintenance fees were paid. Failure to pay maintenance fees causes
a patent to expire early, and is the best indicator of the owner’s belief
302
(or lack thereof) in its value. The study shows, therefore, that
economic value is not correlated with the number of claims. Another
study shows a negative correlation, finding that some patents with
303
more claims are more likely to be invalidated.
Despite the ambiguities associated with claim counts, it is
unlikely that any pricing formula that excludes claim information
304
would be accepted. Thus, some objective, measurable method of
305
analyzing claims must be available in pricing formulas.
One potential way to use claims is to measure the ratio of
backward references and forward citations per claim. One study
showed that an increasing number of backward references for each
claim implied lower quality, whereas increasing forward citations per
306
claim implied increased quality. The implication is that patents with
few claims but many references are incremental. Nonetheless, if a

297. See Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 4, at 41 (“But such an atomized portfolio
would be relatively ineffective in size-terms because of the significant gaps in subject matter
coverage between constituent patents, creating what might be called a ‘swiss cheese effect.’”).
298. Id.
299. Lanjouw & Schankerman, supra note 277, at 10.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 16.
302. Cf. Schankerman, supra note 275 (valuing patents by renewal rate).
303. Allison et al., supra note 288, at 681, 706.
304. See Meeks & Eldering, supra note 6, at 205 (“All [interviewed in-house counsel],
however, believed that the only true measure of a patent’s value comes only after analyzing a
patent’s claims.”).
305. See id. (“Interestingly, the co-founder of an intellectual property analytics company
shared this same view. He suggested that one can employ highly quantitative measures coupled
with sophisticated algorithms to develop proxies for value.”).
306. Lanjouw & Schankerman, supra note 277, at 10–11.
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patent with few claims is cited by many others, then that patent is
more likely to be important.
In any event, patents with more claims are more likely to be
307
litigated, which may indicate an increased value to buyers or
potential licensees, even if not related to the underlying technology’s
value. As a result, a portfolio with many claims may command a
higher price, regardless of patent quality. This counterintuitive result
is not without support. In fact, one theory suggests that as the value of
each individual patent falls, we should expect to see larger and larger
patent portfolios (which will necessarily have more claims in the
308
aggregate).
Perhaps a better measure of value would be counting claim
309
elements, rather than claims. To be invalidated, every single claim
must be found in the prior art or considered obvious. Thus, claims
with more elements are more likely to be valid, because they are
more likely to have an element that is not included in the prior art.
Similarly, to infringe, one must practice every single element of the
claim. This means that claims with more elements are less likely to be
infringed, because companies should more easily design around a
310
claim with many elements. In short, the more claim elements there
are, the less valuable the patent.
Additionally, words introduced in claim elements can be
compared with patent specifications to approximate compliance with
311
disclosure requirements and claim scope. Additionally, elements

307. Allison et al., supra note 270, at 451–53; Lanjouw & Schankerman, supra note 277, at
18.
308. See Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 4, at 53 (“In other words, because the true
value of patents lies in their aggregation (in large numbers), firms seeking patent protection are
increasingly forced to do so via a high-quantity, portfolio-focused patenting strategy.”).
309. See, e.g., Kristen Osenga, The Shape of Things To Come: What We Can Learn from
Patent Claim Length, 28 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 617, 632–34 (2012)
(finding that claim length varies based on whether the claim is dependent or independent).
310. Meeks & Eldering, supra note 6, at 201. Meeks and Eldering use the number of
elements as an initial indication of scope. For portfolio pricing, further detailed analysis of claim
elements could become costly. Indeed, they suggest performing a complete claim construction.
Id. at 201–08. Unfortunately, claim construction is one of the most hotly disputed parts of any
litigation, and district court orders are reversed about a third of the time. David L. Schwartz,
Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent
Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223, 248–49 (2008). As such, a complete claim construction is unlikely
to be a low cost, highly accurate method of patent valuation.
311. F. Russell Denton, Rolling Equilibriums at the Pre-Commons Frontier: Identifying
Patently Efficient Royalties for Complex Products, 14 VA. J.L. & TECH. 48, 69–72 (2009)
(proposing use of descriptive factors to value patents).
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might be combined with the number of technology classes in the
312
patent to assess claim scope. Thus, using some measure of claim
elements, perhaps interactively with backward references, technology
class, and specification, may yield helpful information about the value
of a portfolio.
e. Less Useful Indicators. Some indicators historically linked to
patent quality may not be as helpful for patent-pricing decisions. For
example, some studies have considered parallel patents (sometimes
313
called “patent families”) in other countries. Intuitively, companies
will be willing to spend more money to patent in other countries if
they believe the patent to be valuable. Analytical estimates have
314
shown just that. However, in the case of aggregation, foreign patent
filings may not be a helpful indicator of portfolio pricing. As noted
above, many aggregated patents come from individuals, who may not
have had the resources for foreign filings no matter how valuable
their patents are.
Similarly, maintenance payments (also known as renewal
payments) may be the single most accurate indicators of patent
315
value, but are entirely unhelpful for patent pricing. The reason is
that expired patents, including those that expire due to lack of
maintenance payments, may not be enforced, and attempts to license
316
such patents may be considered an antitrust violation. As such, their
value in patent portfolios is zero.
As a result, payment of fees becomes an unhelpful metric for
pricing a specific licensed portfolio, even if they are extremely helpful
for measuring the value of patents held by a company, a country, or
an issuing in a technology area. By definition, every patent in a
licensed portfolio has had its fees paid, so that metric ceases to have
explanatory meaning. Of course, as noted above, such payments
continue to be very important to determine what other patent
characteristics might be correlated with the decision to pay.

312. See Joshua Lerner, The Importance of Patent Scope: An Empirical Analysis, 25 RAND
J. ECON. 319, 320 (1994) (discussing claim scope in terms of patent classes).
313. E.g. Jonathan Putnam, The Value of International Patent Rights (1996) (unpublished
Ph.D. Thesis, Yale University) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
314. Lanjouw & Schankerman, supra note 277, at 18.
315. Kimberly A. Moore, Worthless Patents, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1521, 1550 (2005); see
Allison et al., supra note 270, at 440–41.
316. See Evelyn M. Sommer, Patent License Restrictions, 59 CONN. B.J. 236, 249–53 (1985)
(stating that collecting royalties from expired patents may be considered an antitrust violation).
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Characteristics associated with a high payment rate will indicate a
higher value, whereas characteristics associated with a low payment
rate will indicate a lower value.
f. Crowdsourcing. To the extent that objective yet qualitative
information about a patent is desired for pricing, crowdsourcing may
be a way to inexpensively learn more about patents in a portfolio. For
example, Article One Partners (Article One) is a company devoted to
317
crowdsourced prior-art collection. Its thousands of members scour
the earth for prior art in many different languages. Thus, before any
transaction, the parties could submit a random sample of patents (or
the patents most likely to be infringed) for a prior-art study. This
would allow the parties to resolve some validity disputes at a much
lower cost than litigation. Indeed, patent owners could submit their
own patents to present comprehensive data at the time of offering. If
patents are to be treated as securities, such disclosures would be in
line with offering memoranda that barrage potential buyers with all
the information available about the offered security.
Crowdsourcing might also be used to determine which patents
are core to a technology. For example, Article One offers “State of
the Art Studies,” in which its members find as many patents as
318
possible relating to a certain technology. Using this technique,
parties would ask members to find all patents relating to, say, mobile
phone antennas. After a few days (or weeks), the parties could
evaluate who owns the patents that users thought important, and
determine what percentage of those patents were in the offered
portfolio. Article One has published the results of such studies in the
319
past.
Crowdsourcing need not stop at prior art, however. If there are
questions about the breadth of patent claims, then users of
320
Mechanical Turk could help. Mechanical Turk offers the services of
millions of “micro task” users, who get paid as little as a penny to

317. ARTICLE ONE PARTNERS, http://www.articleonepartners.com (last visited Aug. 20,
2013).
318. Weekly Discussion: Guaranteed Rewards, ARTICLE ONE PARTNERS (Apr. 27, 2010),
http://www.articleonepartners.com/newsletter/20100427.html.
319. Marshall Phelps & Cheryl Milone, LTE Standard Essential Patents Now and in the
Future, ARTICLE ONE PARTNERS (Feb. 2012), http://newsletters.articleonepartners.com/news_
f1317eac-ee13-5a66-d0f5-38ea99a4c1eeLTE-Standard-Essential-Patents-Now-and-in-theFuture.pdf.
320. See MECHANICAL TURK, http://www.mechanicalturk.com (last visited Nov. 10, 2012).
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perform a simple but potentially repetitive task. Customers
submitting tasks to the website can ask that only users with particular
skills and accuracy rates participate. Thus, licensing parties could
submit patent claims to technically inclined Mechanical Turk users,
asking them to submit the name of one product that might be
infringing the patent claim for a penny. For a mere $100, parties could
get a sample of ten thousand potentially infringing products. For
$1,000, the parties could get a list of ten potentially infringing
products associated with each of ten thousand different patents. The
licensing parties could use the frequency that the accused product
shows up on the list to determine the potential scope of the claims
and the scope of the portfolio.
4. Prospects. Despite the myriad ways that patent portfolios
might be valued, an efficient method of pricing may be difficult to
achieve in practice. Even if a formula with objective indicia were
developed, that might not be enough for particular institutional
buyers. For example, Microsoft evaluates patents based on at least
three criteria: the potential for licensing or resale revenue, the
potential to reduce litigation risk, and the potential strategic value
(such as providing exclusive rights to technology or dissuading
321
competitors from implementing a feature). These three criteria are
interrelated, but each is informed by a very different analysis, some of
which is necessarily subjective to the company rather than based on
objectively measurable criteria. Thus, although company stock may
have differing values for different holders (for example, majority
ownership might command a premium), patent portfolios may always
have a different value to every company that considers them.
As a result, critics may be concerned that any pricing set will not
reflect the “true” pricing of a portfolio. Instead, they worry that
undue leverage from aggregation, hold-up, and other transactions
322
costs will inflate the actual cost above the “real” cost.
This may be true, but securities laws can certainly help by forcing
additional disclosures that will aid in pricing and reducing
information asymmetry.
Further, the notion that there is a “true” cost of any portfolio is
an incomplete picture of market transactions. As noted above,
purchasers—but also licensees—are not completely helpless. They
321. Kelley, supra note 1, at 127–28.
322. Carrier, supra note 61, at 3.
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can refuse to license and force the patentee to file suit, a potentially
costly affair. They can negotiate prices based on the size and quality
of portfolios. They can cross-license patents. They can agree not to
infringe certain patents. In short, even if the price is “inflated” in the
eyes of an outside observer, the transaction price represents the
willingness to pay for the patents at that time, and is thus the marketclearing price. Like it or not, this is the value of the portfolio to the
specific parties at that specific time.
To be sure, that price may not be the price that infinite
competitors would bid with full information for an asset of known
value. The efficient price may be unknowable and unachievable, even
with the aid of securities rules. The goal of some of the objective
pricing methods discussed above is internalization of inefficiency
concerns, such as bargaining leverage, technology, and
323
commercialization using objective indicia. These more complex
models might even include aspects of game theory to replicate the
types of subjective considerations and negotiations that hinder
324
current valuation methodologies.
CONCLUSION
The definition of securities is deliberately both broad and
flexible. Though treating patent portfolio transactions as investment
contracts may push the limits of that definition, such transactions
arguably fall within the definition set forth by the Supreme Court.
More importantly, the reasons for treating such transactions as
security transactions reflect the purposes of securities laws. In the
wrong environment—indeed, the environment some people believe
currently exists—portfolio owners can holdup potential licensees by
threatening to enforce a vast portfolio of patents. Although that
threat will likely never be fully alleviated, securities treatment can
help.
First, such treatment can assist with market integrity. Public sale
restrictions would not be very helpful because most licenses would
likely fall under some exception. Further, a law that denied the ability
to license at all (which the securities laws envision) would be awful; it
would force patent holders to sue small potential licensees in the first

323. See Denton & Heald, supra note 9, at 1219–24 (describing ways to incorporate data into
an option-pricing formula).
324. Id. at 1236–37 (discussing the role of game theory in patent valuation).
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instance because small companies could not license without violating
the law. This worst-case scenario is unlikely; most transactions would
likely fall into an exemption.
Even if private sales are the norm, rules that regulate material
misstatements or omissions of fact—truth telling—might be very
beneficial in the market. Such rules might limit misstatements by
licensors about companies that had licensed in the past, about the
existence of prior art, or of some other fact that might affect the value
of the portfolio. In other words, if patents in the portfolio are
invalidated, all licensees might have an affirmative cause of action for
securities fraud due to the omitted facts associated with the patents.
Perhaps this requirement might help level the negotiating table.
Second, treating portfolios as securities might aid in market
formation. From a regulatory standpoint, securities laws limit the use
of “dark markets,” so that transactions would be handled by a
clearinghouse. Companies are beginning to create such
clearinghouses, and legal rules would only accelerate formation.
Clearinghouses, in turn, would help connect buyers with sellers,
identify technologies claimed by patent owners, and reveal pricing to
other market participants.
325
From an encouragement point of view, simply calling each
transaction a securities transaction might incentivize the
implementation of objective pricing methodologies. These pricing
methodologies serve the market in two ways: they reduce the effect of
potential hold-up on patent pricing, and they reduce transaction costs.
There is no wholesale cure to the problem of hold-up for
aggregated patent portfolios. Assuming that aggregation is here to
stay, and that all types of companies are aggregating patents, treating
patent portfolios as securities could go a long way toward easing
concerns.

325. See generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008) (arguing that default rules can
encourage behavior even if the rules can be avoided without legal penalty).

